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LIBERTAD v. Liberalism:
An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from within
Liberal International Relations Theory
DAVID P. FIDLER*
Professor Fidler's article examines the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, more well known as the Helms-Burton
Act, from within liberal international relations theory. He takes as his starting
point the controversy that the Helms-Burton Act has produced among liberal,
democratic states. Professor Fidler outlines the major tenets of the liberal
tradition in international relations thinking: promoting economic
interdependence, international aw, international institutions, and democracy.
He then looks at the arguments made by opponents of the Helms-Burton Act
from within each of these liberal tenets, showing how opponents believe the
Helms-Burton Act undermines economic interdependence, violates
international law, by-passes international institutions, and does little to
promote democracy in Cuba. Professor Fidler next places the arguments of
the proponents of the Helms-Burton Act within the same four tenets of the
liberal tradition and explores in detail the arguments put forward that the
Helms-Burton Act conforms with, and even progressively develops,
international law. The article moves to consider that the two sides in the
Helms-Burton controversy belong to distinct perspectives within the liberal
tradition. The proponents of the Helms-Burton Act exhibit the tendencies of
liberal realism, while the opponents of the Act reflect the teachings of liberal
internationalism. Locating the opponents and proponents of the Helms-Burton
Act within these two competing perspectives within the liberal tradition helps
explain the firestorm that has developed between liberal states over this piece
ofAmerican legislation. Finally, Professor Fidler offers a proposal to bridge
the gap between liberal realism and liberal internationalism in a policy
towards Cuba that attempts to bring the warring Helms-Burton factions
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. I would like to thank
my research assistant, Peter Daniel DiPaola, for his help in preparing this article. The ideas in this article
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together on how to exercise economic power against Castro, the proper role
for international organizations and international law, and an ethical
convergence for providing some compensation for the victims of Castro's
illegal expropriations ofproperty.
LIBERTAD V. LIBERALISM
INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (the "Helms-Burton Act" or the "Act")' has
produced a firestorm in the relations between the United States and some of
its closest allies and trading partners. The Helms-Burton Act has placed strain
on the so-called "liberal alliance" of democratic States that spans the North
American hemisphere and much of Europe. Some international relations
scholars have argued that relations among the States in this "liberal alliance"
are different from relations between liberal and non-liberal States, particularly
because democratic States do not wage war on each other.' While the Helms-
Burton Act will not lead to war among liberal States, it has provoked from
many democracies a hostility and vehemence rarely seen in the relations
among liberal States.
The controversy between the United States and other democratic States
over the Helms-Burton Act is interesting because it has created something of
a paradox for liberal thinking about international relations. Canada, Mexico,
the democratic Member States of the European Union, and other States accuse
the United States of violating a plethora of liberal principles on international
relations through the enactment and implementation of the Helms-Burton Act.
Yet, the world's oldest and most prominent liberal State enacted the Helms-
Burton Act in accordance with the democratic process in pursuit of bringing
democracy to Cuba and upholding international law. Both the proponents and
opponents of the Helms-Burton Act lay claim to the liberal tradition of
thinking about international relations, which is why it makes for an interesting
episode to analyze from within the liberal tradition of international relations
theory.
In this article, I undertake to examine the Helms-Burton Act and the
controversy it has caused through the tenets of the liberal tradition. My
analysis involves six steps. First, I briefly describe the factual background to
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. The implementing regulations for the Helms-
Burton Act have been published as follows: (I) Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (May 17, 1996); (2) Guidelines
Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (June 17,
1996); and (3) Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Indirect Financing in Cuba, Civil Penalties, 61 Fed. Reg.
37,385 (July 18, 1996).
2. See, e.g., Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part 1, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, id. at 323.
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the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. Second, I briefly summarize the
major tenets of the liberal tradition of international relations thinking. Third,
the connection between the opposition to the Act and the liberal tradition is
explored. Fourth, I explore how the principles contained within the Helms-
Burton Act relate to the liberal tradition. Fifth, I present the controversy over
the Helms-Burton Act as a clash between liberal realism and liberal
internationalism. Finally, I offer a proposal to bring the liberal realist and
liberal internationalist strands on the Helms-Burton Act together to rejuvenate
the liberal tradition and the promise of freedom for Cubans.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
I
The controversy over the Helms-Burton Act belongs to the long and
acrimonious history of U.S.-Cuban relations after Fidel Castro came to power
in 1959. After coming to power, Castro adopted Marxist policies and aligned
himself with the Soviet Union. Part of Castro's implementation of socialist
policy was the expropriation of foreign-owned property-much of it owned by
American nationals or corporations.3  The Cuban government has never
provided compensation for this expropriated property4 as required by
international law.'
Since 1962 the United States has maintained an economic embargo on
Cuba.6 Over the decades, the wisdom of the American embargo on Cuba has
been questioned because the United States stands virtually alone in its
economic strategy towards Cuba." While many of America's best allies, like
Canada and Great Britain, may have disagreed with the embargo policy, the
right of the United States to pursue this policy was never questioned as a
3. See Brice M. Clagett, Title 111 of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 434-435 (1996) (noting "the massive confiscations of property by the Castro regime
in the early 1960s" and that "[t]he claims of preconfiscation U.S. nationals alone as certified by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, including interest, now total more than $6 billion.") [hereinafter Clagett,
Title III].
4. Id. at 434 (noting Cuba has not made reparation for the massive confiscations of property).
5. See OPENHEAn's INTiERNAnONAL LAw 920-21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed., 1992), at 920-21 (noting that international law requires compensation for expropriated property).
6. For a discussion of the history of the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM.J. INT'L. L. 419, 420-22 (1996).
7. The controversy over the wisdom of the embargo is currently a hot topic of debate. See, e.g., Susan
Kaufman Purcell, The Cuban Illusion: Keeping the Heat on Castro, FoREIGN AFF., May/June 1996, at 159
(arguing that a strong U.S. embargo is the best way to achieve democracy and an open economy in Cuba);
Wayne S. Smith, Cuba's Long Reform, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 99 (advocating ending the
embargo to promote capitalism and democracy in Cuba).
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matter of international law.' Over the years, Presidents have modified the
embargo to tighten or loosen it as the chief executive determined would serve
American foreign policy.9
While many other democratic States engaged in trade with Cuba, Castro's
Marxist ideology kept Cuba firmly allied and very dependent on the Soviet
Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba faced an economic crisis."
In 1992, Congress found that "[e]vents in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba's external support and threaten Cuba's
external support and threaten Cuba's food and oil supplies."" Through the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Congress moved to tighten the economic
embargo on Cuba by eliminating licenses to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies exporting to Cuba. 2 In a foreshadowing of the opposition to the
Helms-Burton Act, many countries criticized the Cuban Democracy Act as an
unlawful attempt by the United States to exercise its jurisdiction
extraterritorially. 3 The Cuban Democracy Act also imposed sanctions against
countries providing assistance to Cuba'4 and laid down United States policy
toward a transitional Cuban government'" and toward a democratic Cuban
government.'6 Congress' objective in the Cuban Democracy Act was to
increase the pressure on the Castro regime when it was facing economic and
financial crisis.
8. The U.S. embargo of Cuba is a primary boycott, which "does not usually raise issues of
international law, because the boycotting state is exercising its jurisdiction in its own territory or over its
own nationals." Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 429.
9. See id at 421-22 for a discussion of how presidents have modified the embargo for foreign policy
purposes.
10. See Clagett, Title III, supra note 3, at 434 (noting that "the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
resulting termination of Soviet aid to Cuba... has created severe economic and financial problems for the
regime.").
11. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001(5) (1997) [hereinafter Cuban Democracy Act].
12. Id. § 6005(a).
13. See Joanna R. Cameron, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: The International Implications, 20
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 137, 141 (1996) (noting Canadian, British, European Union, and United Nations
opposition to the extraterritoriality of the Cuban Democracy Act). Monroe Leigh, a major figure in
American international legal circles, testified in hearings on the Helms-Burton Act that "certain sections of
the Cuban Democracy Act did indeed violate international law because they purported to prescribe the
conduct of foreign incorporated companies who had no jurisdictional contacts with the United States." The
LIBERTAD Act: Implementation and International Law, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western
Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 23 (1996)
[hereinafter Libertad Hearing].
14. See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 1I, § 6003(b).
15. See id. § 6006.
16. See id §6007.
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Castro responded to the crisis by liberalizing Cuba's foreign investment
laws in an attempt to lure foreign direct investment as a way to stimulate
economic growth. 7 The prospect that foreign investors could be purchasing
or otherwise utilizing illegally expropriated American property prompted the
Clinton Administration to warn other governments in 1993 that "[c]are should
be taken by prospective investors to ensure that property the Cuban
government attempts to sell or otherwise dispose of is not the subject of a
claim by a U.S. national."'" Thus, the United States had placed the
international community on notice that the use by foreign investors of illegally
expropriated American property in Cuba would be a matter of concern to the
United States.'9 Nevertheless, Cuba began to attract foreign investors. 20
In February 1995, Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton
introduced legislation directly aimed at deterring foreign investment in Cuba
by (1) subjecting foreign companies that "traffic" in expropriated property in
Cuba to claims by U.S. nationals, and (2) denying visas to any person
trafficking in such expropriated property and to the spouses and children of
such person.2' The Clinton Administration openly opposed this proposed
legislation, and then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned that he
would recommend that President Clinton veto it.' The Helms-Burton
legislation made little progress after its introduction until the Cuban
government shot down two unarmed civilian planes on February 24, 1996.'
After this event, which provoked worldwide condemnation of the Cuban
17. See, e.g., Ron First, Cuba's Changing Foreign Investment Climate: Castro's Attempt to Lure
Foreign Investors, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 295, 296 (1996); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate,
Recommended Features of a Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C.J. INT'L
L. &CoM. REG. 511, 513 (1996).
18. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western
Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 193 (1995)
[hereinafter Helms-Burton Hearing](from Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Circular to All
Diplomatic and Consular Posts, Sept. 1993).
19. See Clagett, Title III, supra note 3, at 435 (noting that the U.S. State Department "has repeatedly
recognized" U.S. interests "in trafficking by third-country nationals.").
20. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 17, at 513 ("Foreign investment in Cuba has bolstered certain
economic sectors, particularly tourism, and has served to expand the island's economic relations with other
countries.").
21. See S. 381, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995); H.R. 927, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
22. See Steven Greenhouse, Bill to Tighten Economic Embargo on Cuba is Passed with Strong
Support in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at A8 (noting that Secretary of State Christopher warned
Speaker Gingrich that he would recommend a presidential veto of the bill).
23. See Jerry Gray, President Agrees to Tough New Set of Curbs on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996,
at Al (noting that presidential and congressional agreement on the Helms-Burton legislation was "[d]riven
largely by the downing of two civilian American planes by the Cuban military... .').
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action, the Helms-Burton legislation accelerated towards passage in both
houses of Congress. President Clinton agreed to sign the bill into law if the
legislation allowed the President to postpone litigation in U.S. courts against
alleged traffickers in expropriated property subject to a claim by a U.S.
national. Congress included such a provision in the final legislation,24 and
President Clinton signed it on March 12, 1996. The Act provides two different
ways to punish third-state nationals who traffic in illegally expropriated
property formerly owned by a U.S. national: (1) Title III subjects traffickers
to civil claims that can be filed in U.S. courts by U.S. nationals who were
American nationals at the time of the illegal expropriations, or were Cuban
nationals at that time who have subsequently been naturalized as U.S.
citizens;25 and (2) Title IV instructs the U.S. government to deny visa
applications for traffickers and their family members.'
President Clinton took action to postpone lawsuits under the Act until
January 1997 on July 17, 1996.27 On January 3, 1997, President Clinton
suspended for another six months the effective date for lawsuits under Title In
of the Act. 8 The President cannot, however, suspend Title IV of the Act. As
of early January 1997, the U.S. State Department has used Title IV to punish
a Mexican telecommunications company and a Canadian mining company for
their involvement in Cuba, and was investigating twelve other companies for
trafficking in violation of the Helms-Burton Act. 9
II. THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THINKING
The ink was not dry from President Clinton's signature on the Helms-
Burton Act when liberal States began to attack it vigorously." The
suspensions of the private cause of action by President Clinton on two
occasions has not produced a weakening in the opposition of liberal States to
24. See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 306(bXl).
25. Id. at Title III.
26. Id. at Title IV.
27. Statement on Action on Title 111 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1995, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1265 (July 16, 1996); David E. Sanger, Clinton Grants, Then
Suspends, Right to Sue Foreigners on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996, at Al.
28. Nancy Dunne, Clinton Suspends Helms-Burton Again, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at 3.
29. Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law Postponed Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1997, at 1.
30. See Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 432 (noting European Union reactions to the Helms-Burton Act);
Richard W. Stevenson, Canada, Backed by Mexico, Protests to US. on Cuba Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1996, at A7 (noting Canadian and Mexican protests against the Helms-Burton Act).
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the Helms-Burton Act." Before discussing the opposition of liberal States to
the Helms-Burton Act, I need to describe briefly the main tenets of the liberal
tradition of thought on international relations. The liberal tradition "refers to
a body of thought the core of which is the liberty of the individual ...
Liberalism posits ... that international relations is not fundamentally about
obtaining power as a shield against anarchy but is about protecting individual
liberty at home while fostering individual liberty overseas." The liberal
tradition has developed certain strategies for fostering the objectives of
individual liberty at home and abroad. The most solidly established strategies
within the liberal tradition are: the promotion of economic interdependence,
international law, international institutions, and the protection and spread of
democracy.
A. Promoting Economic Interdependence
A fundamental aspect of the liberal tradition has been the faith in the
beneficial consequences for international relations of economic
interdependence between States and peoples. The policy of free trade allows
individuals and their private enterprises to bind peoples and States together in
a tight, peaceful relationship that is mutually beneficial. As Robert Gilpin has
stated:
In essence, liberals believe that trade and economic
intercourse are a source of peaceful relations among nations
because the mutual benefits of trade and expanding
interdependence among national economies will tend to foster
cooperative relations .... A liberal international economy
31. See, e.g., Pascal Fletcher, Canadian Minister Seeks to Coax Cuban Democratic Reforms, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at 5 (reporting on visit to Cuba of Canadian foreign minister that "reinforces strong
Canadian opposition to the U.S. Helms-Burton law"); Caroline Southey & Nancy Dunne, Brussels Firm on
Protest over Cuba Law, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1997, at I (reporting European Commission's determination to
pursue its case against the Helms-Burton Act before the World Trade Organization).
32. David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 413 (1996) [hereinafter Fidler, Caught Between Traditions].
33. See David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the Reagan Years, I1
ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 57 (1994) (noting that "[i]nterdependence is one of the oldest and most
famous of the liberal progressive ideas for changing the political conditions in international relations.")
[hereinafter Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought]. See also Scott Burchill, Liberal Internationalism, in
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25, 35-36 (Scott Burchill & Andrew Linklater eds., 1996)
(discussing importance of international trade to liberal thought).
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will have a moderating influence on international politics as
it creates bonds of mutual interests and a commitment to the
status quo.34
While the liberal faith in economic interdependence has suffered setbacks
in the history of international relations," free trade has emerged in post-Cold
War international relations as one of the hottest ideas on the international
agenda. 6 The United States has been very active in promoting free trade and
economic interdependence in the post-Cold War era by entering into the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), pushing hard for the completion
of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that produced a revised General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the new World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), deciding to engage communist China primarily
through trade and investment, and participating in talks to expand free trade
principles in the Americas, between the United States and the European Union,
and in Asia.
B. Promoting International Law
Another strong theme in the liberal tradition is the promotion of
international law. The liberal tradition has long included a belief in legal
progress in international relations, a process in which international law
provides a basis for independent States to pursue their interests according to
the rule of law rather than the rule of the powerful." International law offered
liberalism a way not only to ameliorate armed conflict but also to build the
necessary framework to encourage States and their citizens to embrace free
trade and the resulting economic interdependence. 8
The United States has a long tradition of fostering the rule of law in
international relations. Eugene Rostow has argued that "[f]rom the day that
34. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 31 (1987).
35. See Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 443 (discussing the weakening of the
faith in economic interdependence in liberal thought during the 20th century).
36. Id. at 444; Burchill, Liberal Internationalism, supra note 33, at 43 ("As the end of the century
approaches, the world economy more closely resembles the prescriptions of Smith and Ricardo then at any
previous time.").
37. See Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 55 (discussing liberal ideas about legal
progress in connection with the use of force).
38. Id. at 59 (noting that "international law was central to interdependence by free trade" in Kant's
liberal thinking).
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American Presidents and Secretaries of State emerged as actors in world
politics, they became important spokesmen for international law, and
contributed disproportionately to its development."39 In fact, controversies
about U.S. foreign policy are often given extra fuel by accusations that the
United States is acting in violation of international law.'
C. Promoting International Institutions
A third trait in the liberal tradition is the support liberal States have given,
particularly in the twentieth century, to the creation and maintenance of
international institutions. In liberal thought, Kant and Bentham first
introduced the idea of international organization.4 While the nineteenth
century saw no progress towards the creation of formal international
organizations,4 liberal States during the twentieth century have led the way in
the creation of multilateral international institutions, like the League of Nations
and the United Nations; multilateral international processes, like GATT; and
regional organizations, like the European Community ("EC") and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The liberal tradition seems to contain a belief
"in the necessity of leadership by liberal democracies in the construction of a
peaceful world order through multilateral cooperation and effective
international organization." The appeal to international institutions is
sometimes referred to in international relations theory as "institutionalism,"
which reflects "the belief that 'rules, norms, principles and decision-making
procedures' can mitigate the effects of anarchy and allow states to cooperate
in the pursuit of common ends." While institutionalism is sometimes
39. EUGENE V. RosTow, THE IDEAL IN LAW 272 (1978).
40. See, for example, the controversy about the Reagan administration's policies and actions towards
Nicaragua and its reaction to Nicaragua's filing of a claim with the International Court of Justice that the
U.S. was violating international law by pursuing such policies, discussed in Fidler, War, Law & Liberal
Thought, supra note 33.
41. See Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 420-23 (discussing Kant's and
Bentham's ideas-on international organization).
42. Id. at 424 (discussing lack of progress prior to World War I toward an international organization
empowered to deal with international peace and security); Mark W. Zacher & Richard A. Matthew, Liberal
International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands, in CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 107, 117 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed.,
1995) (noting that international cooperation through international organizations "did not become a central
thesis in the thinking of the great majority of liberals until after World War I.").
43. Richard N. Gardner, The Comeback of Liberal Internationalism, WASH. Q., Summer 1990, at 23.
44. Anne-Marie Slaughter. Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 724-25 (1995).
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presented as a separate theory from liberalism,4 the dominant role played by
liberal States in the creation of international institutions in this century makes
institutionalism part of the liberal tradition. ' 6
The liberal attachment to international institutions has been particularly
pronounced in the post-Cold War era in connection with the pursuit of
economic interdependence. The EC has moved toward completion of the
common market in the early 1990s. The United States, Canada, and Mexico
created NAFTA to promote hemispheric free trade; and the United States and
other democracies pushed for the establishment of the WTO to provide
institutional support and progress for GATT's liberal trade principles. These
international institutions stand as powerful monuments to the liberal tradition
in that liberal States have utilized international law to promote economic
interdependence.
D. Protecting and Promoting Democracy
The final fundamental tenet of the liberal tradition is the protection of
existing democratic States and the encouragement of the spread of democratic
ideas, values, practices, and institutions throughout the international system. 7
The protection and promotion of democracy serves a number of liberal
objectives: (1) democracies protect civil and political rights of individuals
through constitutional or statutory law;4 (2) democracies allow individuals to
elect their leaders, thus providing for self-government; 9 (3) democracies
encourage market economies because of the importance accorded to individual
property rights;5" and (4) democracies are less likely to wage war on each other
than with non-democratic States, making the spread of democracy the spread
45. See id at 724 n. 25.
46. See Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 430 (placing attachment to international
organizations with respect to issues of peace and security within the liberal tradition); ROBERTO. KEOHANE,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY at vii,
9 (1989) (discussing "Neoliberal Institutionalism" and how liberalism includes a prominent role for
international institutions).
47. Zacher & Matthew, supra note 42, at 122-23 (discussing the liberal thesis that "the prospects for
greater international peace and comity rests on the growth of liberal democratic governments.").
48. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 208 (1993) (noting importance of constitutional law to liberalism in placing
limitations on governments and protecting minority rights).
49. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 509
(1995) ("Liberal States are States with some form of representative democracy .... ).
50. Id. ("Liberal States are States with... a market economy based on private property rights . .
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of international peace." The liberal tradition believes that the protection and
promotion of democracy in international relations secures individual liberty at
home while increasing individual liberty internationally through representative
government, human rights protections, opportunities to engage in economic
interdependence, the stability and predictability of the international rule of law,
the fading likelihood of war and all its horrors, and the possibility of effective
cooperation on global issues within international institutions.
A measure of the prominence of promoting democracy in the liberal
tradition is that this objective is seemingly the only thing about which
proponents and opponents of the Helms-Burton Act agree. The Helms-Burton
Act explicitly sets out to stimulate a transition to democracy in Cuba. 2
Opponents agree wholeheartedly with this fundamental objective but
vehemently disagree with the means adopted to achieve this end."
E. Applying the Liberal Tradition
While an outline of the fundamental tenets of the liberal tradition may
seem simple, the liberal tradition is not as unified as the outline suggests. As
Stanley Hoffmann has observed, liberals have historically been divided on how
to deal with the real world of international relations.' The differences among
liberals often arise over whether, when, and how to apply the tenets of the
liberal tradition in the circumstances of a concrete situation. The Helms-
Burton Act controversy is another manifestation of the division among liberals
about the application of the tenets of the liberal tradition to real world foreign
policy challenges.
51. Id (Liberal States "are far less likely to go to war with one another than they are to go to war with
non-liberal States .... ).
52. See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 3(1), (4)-(5).
53. The U.S. special envoy for the Helms-Burton Act admitted during his efforts to persuade
America's allies and trading partners of the importance of the Act that there was "a 'divergence of
philosophical attitudes' over how to bring democracy to Cuba." Eizenstat Sent Packing by Allies,
CARIBBEAN & CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, Oct. 3, 1996, at 2.
54. STANLEY HOFFMANN, Liberalism and International Affairs, in JANUS AND MINERVA: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLmCs 394, 399 (1987).
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111. OPPOSITION TO THE HELMS-BURTON ACT FROM LIBERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Economic Interdependence
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act accuse it of undermining the liberal
objective of economic interdependence. This accusation takes three forms.
1. Policy Towards Cuba
Many of the opponents of the Helms-Burton Act disagree with the general
policy taken by the United States towards Cuba. They believe that the
economic embargo strategy is the wrong way to go about bringing democracy
to Cuba. As Wayne Smith has observed, Canada, European democratic States,
and Latin American States "believe engagement and trade will do more to
encourage Cuban reform than efforts to isolate it politically and strangle it
economically."" The rest of the "liberal alliance" seems to prefer mellowing
Cuba towards democracy through economic interdependence, while the United
States under the Helms-Burton Act is prohibited from using the awesome
power of commerce to change the future of the Cuban people. Many in the
American business community would rather have a chance to contribute to the
gradual transformation of Cuba than sitting on the sidelines watching
companies from other countries establish footholds in a potential emerging
market.56
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act detect inconsistency in the American
approach to Cuba and the approach to communist China, where U.S. foreign
policy employs the economic interdependence strategy to encourage the
gradual reform of China. The use of economic interdependence is, in fact, a
much riskier strategy because China is such a large country with potential to
become a rival great power. Cuba, on the other hand, is very vulnerable to
American economic and cultural power, making economic interdependence a
logical, low-risk policy to provide the Cuban people with a brighter future.
55. Smith, supra note 7, at 105. See A Frozen Approach to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at A32
(arguing that "[w]hat hope now exists for expanding liberty in Cuba and preparing the transition to a post-
Castro era lies in the constructive use of international economic and commercial leverage, not in trying to
bludgeon the rest of the world into joining America's lonely and counter productive economic embargo.").
56. See Pamela S. Falk, Eyes on Cuba: U.S. Business and the Embargo, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr.
1996, at 14 (noting U.S. business opposition to the Cuban embargo).
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Opposition to the American embargo of Cuba also taps into the sentiment
that, in an age of economic globalization where ideological conflicts are dead,
the Cold War mentality behind the embargo and the Helms-Burton Act is
anachronistic. If, as the Helms-Burton Act professes, the ultimate goal is to
engage Cuba in economic interdependence, then the wiser strategy is to put
aside Cold War hatreds of communism and begin building the Cuban path to
democracy through economic interdependence.
2. Hemispheric Economic Interdependence
Canada, Mexico, and Latin American States have been particularly
offended by the Helms-Burton Act because it strikes a blow against the general
movement, initiated by NAFTA and expanded through the idea of an
American hemispheric free trade zone, towards hemispheric economic
interdependence. Opponents claim that the Helms-Burton Act seeks to punish
nationals of other States in the American hemisphere for trying to bring
democracy and prosperity to Cuba through trade and investment. Rather than
engaging its partners in the hemispheric free trade project in constructive ways
about Cuba, the United States has responded in the Helms-Burton Act with
arrogant yanqui flexing of superior power.
3. General Economic Interdependence
The arguments made against the Helms-Burton Act in the context of the
American hemisphere also apply on a much larger scale because Title HI of the
Act strikes a blow at European efforts to engage Cuba economically. In its
letter to the United States requesting consultations under the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO, the EC stated that "a number of provisions [of Helms-
Burton] ... have the intent and effect to restrain the liberty of the EC to export
to Cuba or to trade in Cuban origin goods, as well as restrict the freedom of EC
registered vessels and their cargo to transit through U.S. ports."" Further,
Title IV of the Act uses a very illiberal approach because it seeks to punish
innocent individuals in democratic States for acts committed by Castro thirty-
57. Quoted in Brice M. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law--The United States, or the States
that Have Made Themselves Co-Conspirators with Cuba in its Unlawful Confiscations?, 30 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 35, on file with author) [hereinafter Clagett, Who is
Breaking International Law]. This article is an expanded and updated version of Clagett, Title III supra
note 3.
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seven years ago. Punishing a child of a Canadian business person who seeks
to engage in economic interdependence with Cubans by denying that child
entry into the United States to visit Disneyland has no foundation in the liberal
tradition."8 The attitude of Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act is far out
of tune with the process of economic interdependence that the liberal tradition
has promoted for many years.
B. International Law
A major theme in the criticisms of the Helms-Burton Act has been that it
violates international law. These criticisms also mean that opponents believe
the Helms-Burton Act undermines the liberal tradition's commitment to the
rule of law in international relations. The legal arguments against the Act
usually take two forms.
1. The Helms-Burton Act Violates Treaty Law
The European Union has argued that the Helms-Burton Act violates GATT
and the General Agreement on Services ("GATS").59  It requested
consultations with the United States and then the establishment of a dispute
settlement panel under the WTO to consider its complaints.' The EC has
alleged that Titles III and/or IV of the Helms-Burton Act violate a number of
principles of GATT and GATS.6 First, the EC claims that the Act violates the
58. See Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 429 ("It is hard to believe that Ms. Jones, the daughter of a
corporate executive from Toronto, might be stopped at the border when she returns from her summer
vacation for her junior year at Vassar, but that is what the statute says.").
59. The EC alleges that the Helms-Burton Act's trade restrictions on goods of Cuban origin and the
refusal of visas and exclusion of non-U.S. nationals from the United States violates Articles 1, 111, V, X, and
XIII of GATT and Articles I, 11, VI, XVI, and XVII of GATS. World Trade Organization Homepage,
(visited Mar. 4, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter WTO Homepage]. The
reference to Article I of GATS should probably be Article II because Article I consists only of definitions.
The EC also alleges that, if these measures do not violate GATT or GATS, they nullify or impair expected
benefits under GAT and GATS and impede the attainment of GAIT objectives. Id. Jennifer Hillman,
General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative testified to a U.S. Senate
subcommittee that "the European Union's claims lie solely with respect to title IV.... They have made a
series of allegations with respect to their view that title IV is in violation of the GATS." Libertad Hearing,
supra note 13, at 16 (testimony of Jennifer Hillman). The formal EC complaint encompasses, however, both
GATT and GATS.
60. The EC requested consultations on May 3, 1996. WTO Homepage, supra note 59. It requested
a dispute settlement panel on October 3, 1996. Id. The panel was appointed on February 20, 1997. Guy
de Jonquires, US. Holds Fire over Cuba Panel, FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1.
61. WTO Homepage, supra note 59 (listing GATT and GATS provisions allegedly violated).
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most-favored-nation treatment found in GATT and GATS 2 This claim
alleges that the United States, through the Helms-Burton Act, does not accord
to products or services originating in the EC advantages, favors, privileges, or
immunities granted by the United States to other contracting parties of GATT
and GATS.63 Second, the EC alleges that the Act violates the national
treatment principle because it accords preferential treatment for American
goods, services, and service providers." Third, the EC believes that the Act
violates Article V of GATT, which contains the freedom of transit principle
for goods and vessels passing through the United States on their way to
another destination." Fourth, the EC claims that the Act violates the
prohibition on quantitative restrictions on the importation of any product of the
territory of another contracting party' as well as the requirement to apply any
quantitative restrictions in a nondiscriminatory fashion.67 Finally, the EC
argues that even if the Helms-Burton Act does not violate GATT or GATS it
still nullifies or impairs the attainment of objectives under GAIT." The EC
complaint implicitly includes the argument that the United States cannot
justify breaches of GATT under the general exemptions69 or the national
security exemption.7"
62. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. I [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 44, art. 11 [hereinafter GATS].
63. GATT, art. I(1) (requires that "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties."). GATS, art. 11(1) (requires that "[w]ith respect to any measure covered by this
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service supplies of
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of
any other country.").
64. GATT, art. 111(1) (requires that laws and regulations "should not be applied to imported or
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production."). GATS, art. VI (requires application
of general measures affecting trade in services in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner), and GATS,
art. XVII (requires national treatment in connection with specific market-access commitments).
65. GATT, art. V.
66. GAT, art.XI.
67. GATT, art. XIII.
68. See GATT, art. XXIII(lXb) (stating dispute settlement process can be triggered if the application
by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with GATT, nullifies or impairs the
attainment of any GATT objective). For similar provision in GATS, see GATS, art. XXIII(3).
69. GATT, art. XX.
70. GATT, art. XXI. While this article was in press, the EC and the United States reached an
agreement under which the EC would suspend its WTO complaint against the United States over the Helms-
Burton Act in exchange for U.S. action to exclude European companies from the Act's application. Bruce
Barnard, EU Approves Accord with US over Cuba, But Tensions Remain, J. COM., April 17, 1997, at 2A.
The EC's suspension of the WTO complaint is conditional on the United States keeping its end of the
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Similarly, Canada and Mexico have complained publicly that the Helms-
Burton Act violates NAFTA.7' While the Canadians and Mexicans believe
they have valid claims under NAFTA, neither had formally started NAFTA
dispute settlement procedures as of this writing.' Clagett cites a high-ranking
Canadian official as indicating that Canada would invoke Article 1105(1) on
minimum standard of treatment, Article 1102 on national treatment, and
Article 11 10 on expropriation and compensation." Each of these articles are
in the investment chapter of NAFTA.74 If Canada or Mexico invoked these
articles, it would be arguing that the Helms-Burton Act, if applied to Canadian
or Mexican investments in the United States, would (1) violate international
law on the treatment of foreign investors;" (2) violate the national treatment
principle by treating Canadian and Mexican investments less favorably than
American investors;76 and (3) constitute an unlawful expropriation of foreign
investment."7
2. The Helms-Burton Act Violates Customary International Law
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act also claim that it violates numerous
principles of customary international law. The legal opinion of the Inter-
American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States ("OAS
Inter-American Juridical Committee") is, to date, the most formal statement
on the nonconformity of the Act with customary international law, 7' but
bargain. A senior EC official stated the the "WTO action remains a Sword of Damocles." Quoted in id.
71. The Helms-Burton Act: Biter Bitten, ECONOMIST, June 8, 1996, at 45 (reporting that Canada and
Mexico plan to invoke NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms over the Helms-Burton Act).
72. See also Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 33-34) (stating
that to the best of his knowledge neither Canada nor Mexico have formally presented objections in writing).
Formal consultations under NAFTA have apparently been conducted. See Libertad Hearing, supra note 13,
at 16 (testimony of Jennifer Hillman that as of July 30, 1996 the United States had held two rounds of
consultations with Mexico and Canada). Some Canadian legislators have criticized the Canadian
government for not invoking NAFTA's dispute settlement procedures. Canadian House of Commons
Approves Legislation to Combat Helms-Burton Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1589-90 (Oct. 16, 1996).
73. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 34).
74. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 14-17, 1992, ch. II, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter
NAFTA]. Unlike the EC's GATT complaint, the Canadian official did not indicate that the NAFTA
provisions in trade in goods (NAFTA ch. 3) or trade in services (NAFTA chs. 12, 14) Would be used against
the Helms-Burton Act.
75. Id. art. 1105(1).
76. Id art. 1102(l).
77. Id art. 1110.
78. Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, CJI/SO/II doc. 67/96 rev. 5 (Aug. 23, 1996)
(Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee in Response to Resolution AG/DOC 3375/96 of the
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criticisms have also been voiced in influential international legal periodicals.79
The arguments that the Act violates customary international law focus on Title
m and come in two forms.
a. Protecting Property Rights
The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee found that Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act violated customary international law because such law does
not recognize a private right of action against nationals using expropriated
property in conformity with the laws of the expropriating State, and where the
appropriated asset is not within the jurisdiction of the State of which the
claimant is a national.' As the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee
observes, the liability of individuals for trafficking in expropriated property is
"unrecognized by the international law on this subject[.]"' International law
places liability for the violation of customary international law on the Cuban
government but has not accorded liability of any kind to nationals of third
States that make use of illegally expropriated property.
Further, the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee argues that the
Helms-Burton Act attempts to transfer liability from the Cuban government to
the nationals of third States through the "trafficking" concept.82 Since
international law imposes no duty on the nationals of third parties not to traffic
in illegally expropriated property, the Helms-Burton Act transfers without
justification the liability of the Cuban government to individuals innocent of
any wrong under international law. The Helms-Burton Act thus violates the
principle of nulla poena sine lege because it purports to punish individuals
where no wrong has been committed under international law, which violation
can hardly be consistent with liberal concerns about the liberty and rights of
individuals. Even if, as proponents of the Act claim,83 international law
regulated the use of illegally expropriated property by third-state nationals,
such regulation to date has only amounted to States refusing to recognize title
to "hot property" but has not ever recognized the right of a State to create a
General Assembly of the Organization [of American States]) [hereinafter OAS Committee Opinion].
79. See Lowenfeld, supra note 6.
80. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, % 5(a) and 6(d).
81. Id. 6(e).
82. Id. I 6(c) ("The claimant State does not have the right to attribute liability to nationals of third
States for a claim against a foreign State.").
83. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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private cause of action to subject third-state nationals to the entire
compensatory damages attributable to the foreign State in question.
States whose nationals have been subject to expropriations that violate
international law have taken action against nationals of the State that
undertook the illegal expropriation." Such actions are clearly countermeasures
against the State that first wrongfully expropriated because such counter-
expropriations without compensation would otherwise be illegal under
international law. The Helms-Burton Act targets, however, third-state
nationals on one or both of two theories: (1) the third-state nationals are
themselves culpable under international law for trafficking (but see above
analysis arguing that no such rule exists); and/or (2) the third-state nationals
are agents of the Cuban government in their aiding and abetting the continued
violation of international law. If the agency theory were plausible, then the
United States would not need the Helms-Burton Act because a provision in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act already makes an agent of a State that has
expropriated property in violation of international law subject to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts if the agency owns such expropriated property
and engages in commercial activity in the United States. 5 The agency theory
is not plausible because attributing agency to third-state nationals for
trafficking in illegally expropriated property has no foundation in international
law."
What do opponents of the Helms-Burton Act say when confronted with the
argument that international law, through the source of general principles of
law, includes a duty not to profit knowingly by using illegally stolen
property?"' The implication of this question is that the Act's opponents seem
willing to allow a third-state national to do something under international law
that is prohibited under domestic law. Responses to this argument could take
various forms. First, as suggested above, international law probably allows
States to refuse to recognize title to illegally expropriated property. Second,
"general principles of law" are infrequently used as a source for international
84. See, e.g., Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 113 (1966) ("The
unquestioned right of a state to protect its nationals in their persons and property while in a foreign country
. .. must permit initial seizure and ultimate expropriation of assets of nationals of that country in its own
territory if other methods of securing compensation for its nationals should fail.").
85. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX3) (1976) (amended 1988).
86. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 5, at 1175-76 (discussing treatment of
commercial agents of states in international law).
87. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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law," so it should be approached with great caution, particularly where State
practice provides no support for the principle alleged to be general in domestic
legal systems. A great deal of State practice suggests that some States have
considered the expropriation of foreign-owned property without adequate,
effective, and prompt compensation not to be in violation of international
law.89 Thus, a distinction might be made between the government taking
property for public purposes and individuals stealing property for personal
gain within some domestic legal systems. As Brownlie argues, in connection
with "the law relating to expropriation of private rights, reference to domestic
law might give uncertain results and the choice of models might reveal
ideological predilections. ' "9° Third, international law does not necessarily
incorporate every principle of law that is widely shared in domestic legal
systems. For example, most domestic legal systems prohibit murder, but
international law does not contain a general prohibition against murder.
Fourth, leaping from the domestic prohibition on knowingly using stolen
property to an international legal duty not to traffic in illegally expropriated
property is legalistic and does not account for the different political context of
international relations. The intent of the domestic fencer of stolen property is
to continue to deny the original owner his right to that property. Part of the
intent of the third-state nationals investing in Cuba is ostensibly to bring
democracy and prosperity to Cuba. The creation of liability under
international law for trafficking in illegally expropriated property deters
individuals from contributing to economic interdependence-one of the most
powerful parts of the liberal tradition. The Helms-Burton Act "criminalizes"
policy differences and punishes individuals guilty of no wrong in the process,
neither of which can be justified within the liberal tradition.
Even if international law recognized a duty applying to third-state
nationals not to traffic in illegally expropriated property, the Helms-Burton Act
still violates international law because it deprives third-state nationals of due
process of law to "contest the bases and quantum of claims that may affect his
property."' The potential damages that are set out in the Helms-Burton Act'
88. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that
international tribunals show considerable discretion in using general principles of law).
89. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 922-24 (discussing legal uncertainty about
the proper standard of compensation under international law).
90. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 17.
91. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 6(g).
92. See Helms-Burton Act, supra note I, § 302(a)(1).
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make third-state nationals liable for the entire amount for which the Cuban
government is liable, plus thirty-seven years of interest, plus a possible trebling
of all damages. This sort of punishment bears no relation to the activity of a
third-state national operating a minor investment in Cuba for less than one
year.93 The liability for violating a purported international legal duty not to
traffic has to be tailored to the specific gain of the third-state national from
such trafficking, rather than the liability of the Cuban government, before
proponents can claim that this international legal duty serves liberal ends.
The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee adds a final conclusion to
its international legal analysis of the protection of property: the enforcement
of claims under Title III of the Act against third-state nationals would "itself
constitute a measure tantamount to expropriation and result in responsibility
of the claimant State." In other words, in trying to shift liability from the
Cuban government to third-state nationals, the United States could be
engaging in illegal expropriations under international law, for which it can be
held accountable by third States.
b. Extraterritorial Legislation
The other major international legal attack on the Helms-Burton Act is that
it constitutes an attempt at extraterritorial legislation that violates principles of
customary international law on prescriptive jurisdiction. This attack has taken
two different but related forms.
i. The Act is a Secondary Boycott
Lowenfeld argues that the Helms-Burton Act is in intent and effect a
secondary boycott of Cuba because it attempts to force the nationals of third
States to participate in the American embargo on Cuba by subjecting such
nationals to liability in U.S. courts.9 As Lowenfeld observes, the United
States has long opposed the Arab secondary boycott of Israel and has enacted
93. As Lowenfeld puts it, the liability prescribed under the Helms-Burton Act "may result in damages
equal not to defendants' gain but to plaintiffs' loss, plus interest for some thirty-five years, all subject to
trebling." Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 430.
94. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 1 6(h). This would support any use by Canada or
Mexico of NAFTA Article 1110 against the United States.
95. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 429-30. See also Peter Morici, The United States, World Trade, and
the Helms-Burton Act, 96 CURRENT HIST. 87, 87 (1997) ("Helms-Burton imposes a secondary boycott..
. ."1).
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legislation prohibiting U.S. companies from complying with it.' Lowenfeld
argues that
the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States... to impose
a secondary boycott on Cuba, like the exercise ofjurisdiction
by members of the Arab League to impose a secondary
boycott on Israel, is contrary to international law, because it
seeks unreasonably to coerce conduct that takes place wholly
outside of the state purporting to exercise its jurisdiction to
prescribe.97
Proponents of the Act respond by pointing out that it does not prohibit
trading with or investing in Cuba as long as such activities do not result in
trafficking of illegally expropriated property subject to the Act.9
Theoretically, opponents concede, this argument rings true; but it rings hollow
in practice because the amount of Cuban property subject to claims by U.S.
nationals and Cuban-Americans, combined with the incredibly broad scope of
the term "trafficking" and with the potential liability created by the Act, in
substance produce a secondary boycott effect on Cuba.Y9 In fact, it is not far-
fetched to argue that Congress has chosen to pursue the objective of Cuban
democracy through a secondary boycott strategy that is illegal under
international law."°
ii. Illegal Exercise of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
A related but slightly different approach is found in the argument that the
Helms-Burton Act constitutes an illegal exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
96. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 430.
97. Id. Clagett states that Lowenfeld does not argue that secondary boycotts violate customary
international law. Brice M. Clagett, A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 642 (1996)
[hereinafter Clagett, A Reply]. The quotation provided in the text clearly shows, however, that Lowenfeld
believes that secondary boycotts, like the Arab and Cuban varieties, violate international law.
98. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
99. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 428-29 (discussing impact of the Helms-Burton Act on foreign
businesses doing or contemplating doing business in Cuba).
100. This argument is plausible because proponents of the Act claim the objective is not to win
lawsuits, but to deter trade and investment with Cuba so that Castro's regime crumbles. A leading Cuban-
American supporter of the Act bluntly argued exactly this point: "We're not doing this to win lawsuits. The
main objective is to drive foreigners out of Cuba." Quoted in Scarecrow: Cuba and the United States,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1996, at 36.
318 [Vol. 4:297
LIBERTAD v. LIBERALISM
and thus is not in conformity with international law. Under customary
international law, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must (1) have a
legitimate basis, and (2) be exercised reasonably.' The basis for the Helms-
Burton Act seems to be what is called the "effects doctrine": a State has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to "conduct outside its territory that
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."'" The Helms-
Burton Act explicitly recognizes this jurisdictional basis.1 °3  Lowenfeld
challenges, however, the use of the effects doctrine by the Act."° He argues
that the Cuban government, not the persons possibly subject to U.S.
jurisdiction under the Act, was the author of the effects in the United States
against which the Act takes aim."5 Thus, "the effort to place Helms-Burton
within the effects doctrine is no more than a play on words."'"
The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee and Lowenfeld both argue
that the Helms-Burton Act is an unreasonable exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction and thus violates international law.0 7  According to the
Restatement, a State wanting to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction has to
balance its interests against the legitimate and reasonable interests of other
States.' The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee bases its conclusion
on the lack of any norm in international law that suggests it is reasonable to
exercise jurisdiction over third-state nationals for trafficking in illegally
expropriated property."° Lowenfeld takes a more common sense approach by
noting that no U.S. governmental official or business person would find
Helms-Burton-like legislation passed by France and exercised over U.S.
nationals for their trafficking in illegally expropriated property in Vietnam to
be a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction." Clearly, Lowenfeld and the OAS
Inter-American Juridical Committee believe that the legitimate and reasonable
interests of other States in preserving trade with Cuba outweighs U.S. interests
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 402 and
403 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
102. Id. § 402(IXc).
103. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 101.
104. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 431.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 9; Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 430-32.
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, §403.
109. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 9.
110. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 431-32.
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in subjecting third-state nationals to extraterritorial legislation that exorbitantly
punishes them for the wrongs committed by Cuba.
3. Summary on International Law
Although proponents of the Helms-Burton Act argue that it promotes the
international rule of law, opponents believe that the violations of existing
treaty law and customary international law:outweigh any actual service the Act
might provide for international law. For opponents of the Act, it stretches
credibility for proponents to claim that the Helms-Burton Act upholds
international law by subjecting third-state nationals to liability in U.S. courts
when in the process of doing so it violates treaties and established rules of
customary international law. Opponents of the Act believe that the liberal
commitment to international law does not need "friends" like Jesse Helms and
Dan Burton.
C. International Institutions
What frustrates other liberal democracies about the Helms-Burton Act with
respect to the liberal attachment to international institutions is the United
States' willingness to launch the Act in disregard of key international
institutions like NAFTA and WTO. There is no record of the United States
raising its concerns about trafficking in illegally expropriated property in the
forums provided by NAFTA and WTO."' The United States' willingness to
legislate first and answer questions later reflects an arrogance unbecoming a
liberal State in the era of globalization and economic integration.' As Peter
Morici argues, the Helms-Burton Act hurts longstanding American efforts to
discipline international trade through institutions and rules and "undermines
America's ability to negotiate rules for trade that assure its exports and
multinational corporations freer and fairer treatment abroad because it calls
into question United States resolve to live by the rules it prescribes for
111. The cable disseminated by the Clinton administration in 1993 could not, it might be argued by
opponents of the Act, be considered full diplomatic engagement of major trading allies by the United States
over an issue of such controversy and importance to all involved.
112. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 15 (testimony of Jeffrey Davidow, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, that foreign governments "make the argument that this is an issue to be
handled on a multilateral effort, a cooperative international effort, rather than what they view as a unilateral
action by the United States.").
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others.""' The diplomatic journeys of Under Secretary of State Eizenstat, who
tried to discuss the Act with outraged Canadians, Mexicans, and Europeans,"4
might have been more productive if the United States had prepared the
diplomatic ground before the bill actually passed through the legislature.
NAFTA and WTO would have been convenient forums for such diplomacy.
In this respect, the Helms-Burton Act emanates from that influential faction of
elected officials that distrust multilateralism and prefer American
unilateralism. It is no secret that Jesse Helms, for example, fits this
description.'"
In addition, the final passage and presidential signature on the Act
represented an unseemly, unprincipled reaction to the downing of the Brothers
to the Rescue airplanes, driven not by a commitment to liberal multilateralism
but by the hunt for votes in a general election year. The Clinton
Administration had consistently opposed the Helms-Burton bill until Castro's
destruction of the American aircraft, at which point President Clinton abruptly
reversed his position for fear of looking weak and losing Florida's electoral
votes in November 1996. The Cuban shooting down of the planes did not,
overnight, turn the Helms-Burton legislation into a prudent policy because it
remained substantively the same as it accelerated through Congress to the
President's desk. The liberal commitment to international institutions was
conveniently ignored in order to shore up presidential re-election prospects.
Finally, the whole American approach to Cuba can be seen at odds with
the liberal belief in the utility of international organizations. The American
embargo on Cuba includes denying Cuba any role or place in important
international institutions until Cuba has a democratic government." 6 This
approach to Cuba seems inconsistent compared to the efforts the United States
has made trying to integrate communist China into international
organizations." 7 That the same strategy is still rejected in American dealings
113. Morici, supra note 95, at 88.
114. On Eizenstat's diplomatic efforts, see Cuba and the United States: No, no, no, no, ECONOMIST
Sept. 7, 1996, at 40.
115. See Jesse Helms, Saving the U.N.: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General, 75 FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 2, 7 (arguing that "[e]ither the United Nations reforms, quickly and dramatically, or the
United States will end its participation.").
116. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
117. Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics, 104 FOREIGN POL'Y (Fall
1996), at 4 (noting how "Washington sought to expand the effectiveness of these institutions and to
transform China from a threat to the existing world order into a stabilizing element of it.").
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with Cuba seems to reflect motives estranged from the long-term objectives of
liberal thought on international relations.
D. Democracy
Although the crass politicking for votes that taints the Helms-Burton Act
weakens the argument that it is about promoting democracy in Cuba,
opponents of the Act usually do not doubt that proponents of this law hope that
it will help bring democracy to the Cuban people. Opponents of the Act seem
to believe that the best way to promote democracy in Cuba and protect it in the
United States and elsewhere is to liberalize trade rather than restricting it and
punishing those who engage in it, utilizing international law rather than
violating it, and engaging in 'constructive diplomacy in international
institutions rather than ignoring them." 8 For opponents, the only link between
the Helms-Burton Act and the liberal tradition is the claim that it protects and
promotes democracy. But, under the liberal tradition, the end does not justify
the means.
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act also sense in the Act a lack of
historical sensibility in its proponents. In the deadly game of power politics
played during the Cold War, American isolation of Cuba may have made
sense. But with communism a dead ideology, and with Castro's days
numbered, liberal States could bring democracy to Cuba not by reliving the
Cold War but by unleashing the awesome power of economic interdependence
disciplined by international law and cooperation through international
institutions. Viewed from this perspective, the Helms-Burton Act seems like
the last spasm of a Cold Warrior mentality lost in a world where the past is not
a reliable guide for a future to be dominated by economic globalization and
integration.
118. Lowenfeld concluded his critique of the Act as follows: "Perhaps all this could be forgiven if
the Helms-Burton Act could really bring about liberty and democracy in Cuba. I see no reason to believe
that it will do so." Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 434.
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IV. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT'S PRINCIPLES AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION
A. Economic Interdependence
The Helms-Burton Act does not make use of the liberal belief in economic
interdependence in connection with U.S.-Cuba relations, at least while Castro
retains power. Title I of the Helms-Burton Act strengthens the economic
embargo of Cuba by tightening enforcement of the embargo" 9 and prohibiting
indirect financing by Americans of transactions involving expropriated
property subject to a claim by a U.S. national. 20 Congress has determined that
economic interdependence will not be a strategy used to mellow Castro and
smooth the way to democratic government in Cuba. The accusation of
inconsistency leveled at the American embargo of Cuba compared with the
American embrace of China does not faze proponents of the Act because the
plea for consistency forgets that foreign policy principles always operate in
different political and economic contexts. Proponents of the Act probably do
not think they have to apologize for treating the Chinese and Cuban matters
differently based on their radically different contexts.
The Helms-Burton Act does, however, utilize the strategy of economic
interdependence in connection with a "transition government or democratically
elected government in Cuba."'' The Helms-Burton Act specifically defines
what a "transition government"'" and a "democratically elected
government"'" mean for purposes of renewing economic intercourse between
the United States and Cuba. Under Section 204, Congress has authorized the
President to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba after the
President determines that a transition government is in power..2 When the
President determines that a democratically elected government is in power in
Cuba, the President shall report to Congress on policy objectives regarding
trade relations with a democratic Cuba, including extending most-favored-
nation treatment to Cuba, bringing Cuba within the U.S. General System of
Preferences or the preferential trading rights created under the Caribbean Basin
119. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 102.
120. Id. § 103.
121. Id. § 202(a) (instructing the President to "develop a plan for providing economic assistance to
Cuba at such time as the President determines that a transition government or a democratically elected
government in Cuba... is in power.").
122. Id. § 205.
123. Id. § 206.
124. Id. § 204(a).
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Economic Recovery Act, and negotiating free trade agreements (involving
possible Cuban accession to NAFTA).'25 Once the Castro regime is gone, the
Helms-Burton Act commits the United States to creating economic
interdependence between the American and Cuban peoples.
B. International Law
The Helms-Burton Act includes many provisions that purport to promote
international law. While the controversy about the Act has largely focused on
the issue of expropriated property, the Helms-Burton Act appeals to other
areas of international law. In addition, the Helms-Burton Act contains an
interesting mixture of traditional international legal positions and innovative
ways of thinking about international law.
1. Expropriated American Property
A major purpose behind the Helms-Burton Act is "to protect United States
nationals against confiscatory taking and the wrongful trafficking in property
confiscated by the Castro regime."'2 The United States has long maintained
that Cuba's expropriations of American-owned property without adequate,
effective, and prompt compensation violates international law; and the Helms-
Burton Act likewise refers to the "wrongful confiscation or taking of property
belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government."'2 Further,
a requirement for a determination of a transition government 2" and a
democratically elected government'" is progress towards settling the
outstanding claims of U.S. nationals for wrongfully expropriated property.
The Helms-Burton Act clearly promotes adherence to the international legal
principle that expropriations of foreign private investments may only be done
in good faith pursuance of a public purpose, without discrimination on the
basis of nationality, and with the payment of adequate, effective, and prompt
compensation. 3 The Helms-Burton Act does not break new ground in
125. ld. § 202(hXl).
126. Id. § 3(6).
127. Id. § 301(2).
128. Id. § 205(b)(2)(D).
129. Id. § 206(6).
130. See, e.g., The World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, reprinted
in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GuIDELINES
161 (1993) (stating guidelines on expropriation of foreign private investment). While few international
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supporting international legal rules on expropriations of foreign private
investment. In addition, the economic embargo serves as one way the United
States has tried to enforce the international law on expropriations.
What is new about the Helms-Burton Act is the domestic judicial remedy
established to enforce the international law on expropriations.'3' The new
remedy is, of course, the private right of action the Helms-Burton Act gives to
U.S. nationals with a claim to wrongfully expropriated Cuban property to sue
foreign individuals and companies that "traffic" in such expropriated
property. "2 Enforcement of the international legal rules on expropriation also
includes the denial of visas to persons who "traffic" in expropriated
property.' 3 Congress established these enforcement procedures because it
believes that "[t]he international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks
fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for
unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by
governments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the
property.' 1 34
The international legal bases for the new civil remedy in Title III and the
visa denial authority in Title IV need to be carefully examined because they
have been challenged by opponents of the Act. As regards Title IV, the Act's
critics focus on the wisdom of the policy of denying visas rather than on the
legality of the American attempt to do so. 3 As Monroe Leigh has argued,
"international law, in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, does
not question the full discretion of a nation to control admission to its
territory.' 36  Nor does Title IV constitute impermissible extraterritorial
lawyers dispute that international law imposes a duty of compensation for expropriations, the "standard of
compensation which must be paid is a matter of controversy." M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 315 (1994).
131. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY
(LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-202, pt. 1, at 30, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (referring to
the Act's "new civil remedy").
132. Helms-Burton Act, supra note I, § 302(a).
133. Id. § 401.
134. Id. § 301(8). For an interesting discussion of the development in international law of procedural
advances enabling private persons to have direct access to effective international dispute settlement of
investment disputes, see Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997).
135. An exception to this may come under NAFTA's provisions on temporary entry for business
persons. See NAFTA, supra note 74, ch. 16. Under Article 1603, however, NAFTA parties retain power
to refuse to grant entry "under applicable measures relating to public health and safety and national
security." NAFTA, supra note 74, art. 1603(1).
136. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
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legislation because its effect is confined to U.S. territory and is justified "by
the United States' interest in excluding from its physical territory those who
have acted in concert with the Castro regime to interfere with U.S. nationals'
ownership rights."' 37  Title IV seems, therefore, consistent with relevant
international law.
The legal controversy really involves Title III, which as we saw earlier has
been criticized as a violation of international law. The case for Title III's
conformity with international law has been most forcefully made by two senior
American international lawyers-Brice Clagett and Monroe Leigh.' Clagett
and Leigh agree that Title III is fully consistent with principles of customary
international law. Clagett also argues that Title III does not violate GATT or
NAFTA. In addition, Clagett is keen to emphasize that aspects of Title III
represent a progressive development in international law.
a. Customary International Law on Expropriated Property
No opponents of the Helms-Burton Act deny that Cuba violated
international law in expropriating foreign-owned property without paying
compensation. The controversy arises over the international legal
consequences of third-state nationals investing in and profiting from illegally
expropriated property. The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee stated
that customary international law does not prohibit third-state nationals from
investing in and profiting from illegally expropriated property.'39 Clagett
strongly takes issue with this interpretation of customary international law by
pointing to "[a] wealth of authority [that] supports the view that confiscations
that violate international law are not effective in passing title to property, and
a state is under no obligation to recognize a title acquired by such a
confiscation."'" Customary international law does, therefore, have rules that
regulate trafficking in illegally expropriated property.
137. Id. at 27 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
138. See, e.g., Helms-Burton Hearing, supra note 18, at 184 (testimony of Brice Clagett); Libertad
Hearing, supra note 13, at 43 (testimony of Brice Clagett); id. at 22 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); Clagett,
A Reply, supra note 97; Clagett, Title III, supra note 3; Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra
note 57.
139. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 6(e) ("Any use by nationals of a third State of
expropriated property located in the expropriating State where such use conforms to the laws of that State
... does not contravene any norm of international law.").
140. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Lawv, supra note 57 (manuscript at 15).
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As mentioned earlier, a counterargument to this point is that the customary
rule to which Clagett refers only addresses recognition of title but does not
provide authority for the United States to subject individuals of third States to
liability in American courts for dealing in illegally expropriated property.
Clagett and Leigh have argued, however, that international law provides ample
authority for the United States to enact and apply the private cause of action
for U.S. nationals in Title III. First, Clagett and Leigh both point out that the
notion of private causes of action for violations of international law is not
novel because domestic law and courts in the United States and elsewhere
recognize such causes of actions. 4' In connection with victimized U.S.
nationals, Title III is more conservative than the private right of action
recognized by U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act'42 for
violations of the international legal prohibition against torture by a non-U.S.
national against another non-U.S. national.'43 Thus, the Helms-Burton Act can
claim two strong bases under customary international law for creating the
private cause of action in Title HI: (1) the protective principle, a "traditional
international legal concept," that "permits a state to exercise jurisdiction when
crimes 'are directed against the security of the state' or threaten 'the integrity
of governmental functions';'" and (2) the precedents for private causes of
actions that exist for violations of fundamental human rights, of which the
right to own property is one. 4
Opponents of the Act might argue that the attempt to justify Title In on the
precedents set in the context of torture stretches customary international law
141. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 23 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); Clagett, Who is Breaking
International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 15-16, n.3 l) (citing recognition of private causes of action
based on international human rights violations in courts of Germany, the Philippines, Belgium, and the
United States).
142. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1997).
143. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) (holding that Paraguayan national
violated the international legal prohibition against torture in subjecting another Paraguayan national to
torture).
144. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 29 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh quoting the
Restatement). Leigh goes on to argue that the protective principle covers the Helms-Burton Act because
"the practice of trafficking in expropriated property undermines U.S. foreign policy and commerce by
enabling the Castro regime to perpetuate itself at the expense of the property's rightful owners." Id.
145. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 8, 1948, art. 17, HR/PUB/90/I (1990);
European Convention on Human Rights, Mar. 20, 1952, Protocol I art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American
States, Resolution XXX (1948), art. XXIil; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
21, 9 I.L.M. 673; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 14, OAU Doec. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.
5, adopted Jun. 7, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 as the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
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farther than State practice and opiniojuris actually go. In fact, the outpouring
of hostility towards the Helms-Burton Act constitutes a great deal of State
practice that asserts that a State does not have a right to subject third-state
nationals to private causes of action for trafficking in illegally expropriated
property. While State practice may allow a State to disregard claims to title to
property acquired through an illegal confiscation, no State practice exists--
except the Helms-Burton Act--that recognizes the legitimacy of private rights
of action against third-state nationals trafficking in illegally expropriated
property. Proponents of the Act have three responses to this line of argument.
First, Clagett argues that, before the Helms-Burton Act, the only impediment
to suits in the United States against those trafficking in illegally expropriated
property was the federal act of State doctrine, under which federal courts do
not pass judgment on the legality of official acts of a foreign government on
its territory." The Act specifically excludes application of the act of State
doctrine in claims filed under Title II."47 Since the act of State doctrine is not
a rule of international law,' 8 nothing in international law thus prohibited U.S.
nationals from filing private actions against traffickers in U.S. courts. And
given that the opponents of the Act bear the burden of proving that
international law prohibits such actions, 49 private causes of action for
trafficking in illegally expropriated property have a solid basis in international
law.
Second, knowingly dealing in stolen goods is universally recognized as
illegal under domestic systems of law.30 Liability for trafficking in property
expropriated in violation of international law can be seen as a principle of
international law through the source of a general principle of law.' The
argument that liability for trafficking in illegally expropriated property is not
a principle of international law through the channel of general principles of
law rests on the assertion that international law is uncertain as to the standard
146. Clagett, A Reply, supra note 97, at 643-44.
147. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 302(aX6).
148. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 32 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
149. SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (Sept. 7, 1927) (stating that in general,
international law is permissive unless it can be shown to prohibit the activity in question).
150. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 28 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh: "I am unaware
of any nation that does not in its domestic law impose criminal penalties on those who knowingly receive
property wrongfully taken from its owner."); Clagett, Title I1I, supra note 3, at 437 ("Traffickers are fully
aware that they are dealing in tainted property. It can be presumed that the culpability of dealing in stolen
goods is a familiar concept to them from their own legal systems.").
151. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(lXc) (June 26, 1945).
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of compensation.' Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act might respond that
opponents might have a point if Castro had paid some compensation; but,
given that no compensation has been paid, it is reasonable to use analogies to
domestic law all over the world that support the imposition of liability on those
knowingly trafficking in illegally expropriated property.
Third, proponents of the Helms-Burton Act find opposition to it difficult
to understand because allowing third party nationals to traffic knowingly in
illegally expropriated property without liability undermines international law
on the protection of foreign investment and the right to own property. If a
government knows that it can expropriate foreign-owned property without
adequate or any compensation and then sell that property to third party
nationals, the international law on protecting foreign investments suffers.
Proponents of the Act argue that it enforces international law rather than
subjecting it to continued abuse.' 3 In addition, allowing third-state nationals
to traffic knowingly in illegally expropriated property with impunity directly
undermines the right to property.' The liberal objective of economic
interdependence among States and peoples requires that States and peoples
protect foreign investments and support the right to property. In the eyes of
proponents, the Helms-Burton Act's enforcement of international law on
foreign investment and property rights contributes significantly to the liberal
goal of economic interdependence.
b. Customary International Law on Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Opponents of the Act have argued that it violates customary international
law on the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction because it does not have an
adequate basis and it is an unreasonable exercise of such jurisdiction.'"
Proponents vigorously defend the Act's conformity with customary
international law on the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. Leigh argues, for
example, that the territoriality principle gives legitimacy to both Titles In and
IV of the Act.'56 As for Title III, Leigh states that it "allows lawsuits only
152. SORNARAJAH, supra note 130, at 315.
153. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 32 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh on the Act's
enforcement of international law); Clagett, Title 111, supra note 3, at 437-38 (arguing in favor of Title III's
enforcement of international law).
154. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 32 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh, arguing that "the
Act acknowledges the importance of property rights to the safeguarding of democratic freedom.").
155. See Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 431-32.
156. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 27 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
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against those traffickers who enter or operate within the U.S.""' "Similarly,"
Leigh notes, "Title IV has no effect on owners of companies engaged in
trafficking who do not attempt to enter the United States."' 58
Customary international law also recognizes as a basis for exercising
prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially "conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.'" 9  In arguing
against the Act, Lowenfeld asserted that "the effect against which the
legislation is directed ... was caused by the Government of Cuba, not by the
persons over whom jurisdiction is sought to be exercised."'t" Proponents of
the Act point not only to the effect of the illegal expropriations but also to the
adverse effects of third-state nationals trafficking in such expropriated
property. 6' Proponents of the Act cannot, as Lowenfeld does, dismiss the
effects on U.S. nationals of third-state nationals knowingly dealing with
illegally expropriated property.
Monroe Leigh argues that the "jurisdictional basis of the Helms-Burton
Act is further supported by the principle of protective jurisdiction, another
traditional international legal concept."'62 Under the protective principle, a
State has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to "certain conduct outside
its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of
the state or against a limited class of other state interests."'6 The protective
principle provides a jurisdictional basis for laws that punish espionage,
counterfeiting, forgeries of official documents, perjury before consular
officials, and conspiracy to violate immigration or customs laws."6 To this
list, Leigh would add trafficking in illegally expropriated property because
such trafficking "undermines U.S. foreign policy and commerce by enabling
the Castro regime to perpetuate itself at the expense of the property's rightful
owners."
63
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, § 402(IXc).
160. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 431.
161. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 28 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh, arguing that "[t]he
effects of the Cuban expropriation and the subsequent trafficking in expropriated properties have had a wide
impact within the United States.").
162. Id. at 29 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh). Clagett does not discuss the protective principle
as a jurisdictional basis for the Act.
163. RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, § 402(3).
164. Id. § 402, cmt. f.
165. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 29 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
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When a basis for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction exists under
customary international law, the State exercising the jurisdiction must do so
reasonably, which, according to Clagett, means that a State "must balance its
interests against those of other states, and refrain from applying its laws when
the legitimate and reasonable interests of another state are greater."'" Clagett
argues that Cuba "has no legitimate interest, which other states need or should
respect, in confiscating property without compensation and profiting from
foreign investment in that property.' ' 6 The other State with interests in the
matter would be the State whose national is subject to claims under the Act.
As Clagett asserts, the U.S. interest in protecting the property rights of its
nationals is greater and more legitimate than the other "state's interest in
protecting its national's ability to traffic in confiscated property .... ' The
liberal objectives of fostering economic interdependence and property rights
also weighs heavily in the balance in favor of the United States.
c. The Helms-Burton Act as a Lawful Countermeasure
In defending Title III of the Act, Clagett argues that Title Ill can also be
seen as a countermeasure taken by the United States against Cuba in response
to its continued violation of the property rights of U.S. nationals.'69 As a
countermeasure against Cuba, Title III seeks to prevent Cuba from profiting
from the sale or other disposition of illegally expropriated property. Although
Clagett does not address Title IV, it could also be seen as part of the
countermeasure package of the Act. A critical response to the
countermeasures argument might be that the Act targets third-state nationals,
not Cuba, for punishment. Countermeasures are justified against these
individuals, proponents of the Act may respond, because they are actively
aiding and abetting Cuba's violations of international law."" Clagett pushes
the countermeasures argument one step further by claiming that the United
States would be justified in taking countermeasures directly against the
166. Clagett, Title III, supra note 3, at 436.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Clagett refers to them as "joint tortfeasors and co-conspirators" of Cuba. Clagett, Who is
Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 18).
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governments of those nationals trafficking in illegally expropriated property
for their complicity in Cuba's violations of international law. 7,
2. Secondary Boycotts and Customary International Law
Lowenfeld criticized the Act for amounting to a secondary boycott, which
he believes violates international law. Both Leigh and Clagett deny that (1)
the Act is a secondary boycott, and (2) it is clear that secondary boycotts
violate international law." As Clagett notes, "there is nothing in Title I that
proscribes or penalizes trade with Cuba as such."'" Leigh observes that
"[floreign nationals who do business in the U.S. are not forbidden from doing
business in Cuba."'74 If foreign companies have a hard time finding trade and
investment opportunities in Cuba that would not involve trafficking in illegally
expropriated property, then it is the scale of Castro's violation of international
law, not the Act, that is to blame. 75 Even if the Act was interpreted as
constituting a secondary boycott, Leigh argues that "[t]here is little, if any,
authoritative support for the proposition that secondary boycotts are generally
forbidden under international law."'76
3. The Helms-Burton Act and Treaty Law
a. GATT
As noted earlier, opponents of the Act claim that it violates provisions in
GATT, GATS, and NAFTA. Clagett has responded to these claims of treaty
law violations by arguing that the Act does not violate these treaties." His
response to the GATT accusations is that the EC mischaracterizes Title III "as
a restraint on trade rather than an imposition of private civil liability for
knowingly and intentionally receiving or dealing in tainted property.""
171. Clagett, Title 111, supra note 3, at 436.
172. See Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 29-31 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh discussing
secondary boycott issue); Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 11-12)
(discussing secondary boycott argument).
173. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 11).
174. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 30 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
175. Clagett, A Reply, supra note 97, at 641.
176. LibertadHearing, supra note 13, at 30 (prepared statement of Monroe Leigh).
177. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 33-36).
178. Id. (manuscript at 36).
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Although Clagett does not analyze the EC complaint because no detailed
complaint has been made public, he finds "it hard to see the relevance of any
of these provisions to Title Inl [because it] . . . is simply not a trade
regulation."'" To fill out this position, the major items of the EC complaint
concerning GATT will be analyzed from the pro-Helms-Burton perspective.
The EC asserts that the Act violates the most-favored-nation principle of
Article I of GATT. The EC is, in essence, arguing that the United States
accords some advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity to the goods of another
GATT contracting party that it denies to the EC through the Act. First, as
Clagett suggests, Title III of the Act does not regulate trade in goods; so it is
hard to see how exactly the Act denies EC-origin products most-favored-
nation treatment. Second, the Act applies to the traffickers of all States, not
just the EC. In that respect, the Act treats all U.S. trading partners and their
nationals exactly the same, which is what the most-favored-nation principle
seeks to accomplish.
The EC also claims that the Act violates the national treatment principle
of GATT Article III ostensibly by treating American goods more favorably
than EC-origin goods. Given that American companies face a total ban on
doing business with Cuba, it is not clear why the EC believes that its products
are treated in a discriminatory manner vis-6-vis American products in the
United States because of the Act.
According to the EC, the Act also violates the prohibition on quantitative
restrictions in GATT Article XI. Here the theory might be that EC products
containing Cuban-origin ingredients or components are effectively prohibited
from importation into the United States by the Act. One response to this claim
is that the Act does not regulate imports into the United States but rather
subjects traffickers in illegally expropriated property to civil liability in the
United States. If the Act is considered to have the equivalent effect of an
import prohibition, the United States could argue that such a defacto import
prohibition is justified by the Article XX(a) exemption for measures
"necessary to protect public morals"'" or the Article XXI "national security"
exemption.' 8'
179. Id. (manuscript at 36 n.79).
180. Id. (manuscript at 36) (suggesting this exemption to cover any possible violation of GATT).
181. GATT, art. XXI. For a discussion of the possible use of Article XXI by the United States, see
John H. Jackson & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burtom the US., and the WTO, American Society of
International Law Flash Insight, Mar. 1997 (on file with author).
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The complaint that the Act violates GATT Article XHI's requirement to
apply any quantitative restrictions in a nondiscriminatory manner seems ill-
founded because either (1) the Act does not prohibit imports, or (2) the Act
applies equally to goods from all other GATT contracting parties.
Finally, the argument that the Act nullifies or impairs the attainment of
GATT objectives even though it might not violate any GATT provision could
be seen as a weak argument because (1) this type of argument has rarely
succeeded in GATT practice, and (2) protecting the right of third-state
nationals to profit knowingly from illegally expropriated property cannot be
considered a GATT objective that the Act nullifies or impairs."2
b. NAFTA
Clagett also takes on the accusations that Title III of the Act violates
NAFTA. First, he rejects the national treatment claim that the Act
discriminates against Canadian and Mexican companies by subjecting them,
but not American companies, to Title III because American companies face
civil and criminal liability for doing business with Cuba.' Second, he argues
that any claim under NAFTA Article 1105(1), which requires the United States
to treat Canadian and Mexican investments in accordance with international
law, would fail because Title III does not violate international law." Third,
Clagett finds the argument that judgment rendered against Canadian and
Mexican investments in the United States would be illegal expropriations
themselves without merit because "[a] rule against unlawful expropriation does
not.., immunize foreign investors from civil liability to private parties under
a law of general application validly enacted by the government of the host
state." 185
182. Clagett argues: "Trading in drugs, slaves or contraband is not free of 'restraint,' ander GATT
or otherwise; why should trading in stolen property be any more so?" Clagett, Who i Breaking
International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 36).
183. Id. (manuscript at 35).
184. Id. (manuscript at 34).
185. Id. (manuscript at 35). Clagett also finds the potential invocation of NAFTA's rule against
uncompensated expropriation ironic because Title III "does no more than to ask Canada and its comnanies
to recognize the consequences of the same rule in their dealings with Cuba ..... Id.
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4. Upholding Human Rights: Expropriated Cuban Property
Another major purpose behind the Helms-Burton Act is to promote
fundamental human rights and freedoms as found in international law. The
Act clearly sets out the human rights abuses perpetuated by Castro's regime."'
Even opponents of the Helms-Burton Act concede that Castro is a brutal
dictator with no respect for fundamental human rights. 8 ' For proponents of
the Helms-Burton Act, the spectacle of liberal States and nationals of such
States propping up a brutal tyrant by encouraging investors to make profitable
use of illegally expropriated property must seem well outside the liberal
tradition.
The attempt to uphold human rights law has general and specific
applications in the Helms-Burton Act. Generally, the Act advocates that the
best way to improve human rights in Cuba is to force Castro out of power.
Hence the Act tightens the blockade and attempts to deter foreign investment
in Cuba. The specific applications come in two forms: (1) upholding the
individual rights of U.S. nationals subject to illegal expropriations by Cuba
(discussed above), and (2) the right of action the Act gives to Cubans who
suffered illegal expropriations under the Castro regime and who have since
become naturalized Americans.'88 The OAS Inter-American Juridical
Committee found that under international law "[t]he claimant State does not
have a right to espouse claims by persons who were not nationals at the time
of injury." 89 Clagett argues, however, that including Cuban-Americans within
the Act recognizes that these individuals are victims of the violation of the
human right to own property through the discriminatory confiscation of
Cuban-owned private property on the basis of political opinion.'"
Discriminatory expropriations based on political views are illegal under the
international law of expropriation as well as a violation of the human right to
186. See, for example, § 2(15) of the Act which states: "[tihe Castro government has utilized from
its inception and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including by psychiatry), as well as execution,
exile, confiscation, political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as a means of retaining
power." Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 2(15). See also Section 2(20): "The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba
.Id. § 2(20).
187. See, for example, Lowenfeld's comment that he agrees with the Act's findings that the Castro
regime is totalitarian and repressive. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 433.
188. Under § 302(aX5XC) of the Act, Cuban-Americans cannot file suits until 1998. Helms-Burton
Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(5XC).
189. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 6(b).
190. Clagett, Title 111, supra note 3, at 438.
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own property. 9' By giving Cuban-Americans a right of action against
traffickers, the Helms-Burton Act focuses on the human rights violation
suffered by individuals, not on the nationality of the individuals at the time of
the human rights violation. It reflects the universality of human rights law.
Traffickers are, thus, helping to perpetuate violations of a fundamental human
right.
Supporters of the Act have also pointed out that Congress has previously
granted rights of action in the United States to nationals of other States for
human rights violations occurring entirely within the territory of another State
through the Alien Tort Claims Act and in the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991." The difference between these laws and the Helms-Burton Act is
that the right of action given to Cuban-Americans is not directed at individuals
who participated in the violations of international law under color of
government authority but extends to individuals of third States who traffic in
illegally expropriated property. This extension is justified because such third-
state nationals knowingly seek to profit from Castro's flouting of international
human rights law. The Helms-Burton Act stands for the proposition that
individuals have a duty under international law not to profit knowingly from
a government's violation of international human rights law. In interpreting
international law to include such a duty, the Helms-Burton Act is further
developing the area of international law under which individuals have
international legal duties to refrain from certain activities, such as piracy, 93
crimes against humanity,'" and torture. 95 The Act also brings enforcement to
human rights law by creating a right of action for Cuban-Americans in U.S.
courts.
C. International Institutions
The Helms-Burton Act does not allow the United States to engage Cuba
through international institutions. The Act mandates that the United States
oppose Cuba's admission to international financial institutions until a
191. Id.
192. See Helms-Burton Hearing, supra note 18, at 142 (testimony of Bruce Fein).
193. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 753 (noting that under international law
every state has the right to punish pirates for piracy committed on the high seas).
194. Id. at 998 (discussing evolution in international law of a right for states to punish foreign
nationals for crimes against humanity).
195. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (U.S. federal court subjecting foreign
national to U.S. jurisdiction for violating international legal prohibition on torture).
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democratically elected government is in power in Cuba." Further, the United
States is to withhold payments to any international financial institution that
approves financial assistance to Cuba over American opposition. 97 Congress
has also instructed the President to oppose any termination of Cuba's
suspension from the OAS until Cuba has a democratically elected
government.'" The Act also notes that NAFTA has no effect on the U.S.
embargo of Cuba.' 9 As with economic interdependence, the Helms-Burton
Act does not employ the liberal strategy of utilizing international institutions
until Castro's regime has disappeared.
To the accusation that the United States abandoned multilateralism for
arrogant unilateralism in passing the Act, proponents counter that the United
States engaged in constructive diplomacy before the Act was ever drafted and
continued to engage other States on these issues in international fora. Mention
has already been made of the 1993 effort by the Clinton Administration to
warn other governments about U.S. interests in Castro's attempt to sell
illegally expropriated property to foreign investors. American concerns
expressed through diplomatic channels seem to have made little impact on
U.S. trading partners. Clagett notes two specific examples. First, the
Canadian government provides assistance to Canadian businesses seeking to
invest in Cuba apparently "without the slightest concern whether these
'opportunities' involve investing in confiscated properties."2" Second, the
Italian government ultimately controls an Italian corporation that invested in
the Cuban telephone system, which was confiscated from an American
company.2"' Not only have U.S. trading partners failed to prohibit their
nationals from trying to profit from Castro's larceny, but some also actively
aid and abet Castro's continued violations of international law. In addition, the
United States has engaged in discussions with its trading allies subsequent to
the Act's passage "through a variety of international fora, including at the G-7
summit in Lyon, in the OECD, the World Trade Organization, and through the
NAFTA."21 Moreover, as analyzed earlier, the relevance of the WTO and
NAFTA as fora for discussing the Act seems suspect to its proponents who do
196. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 104(a).
197. Id. § 104(b).
198. Id. § 105.
199. Id. § l10(b).
200. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 10).
201. Id. (manuscript at l0 & n. 19).
202. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 14 (prepared statement of Jennifer Hillman, General Counsel,
Office of the United States Trade Representative).
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not see the issues addressed by it as trade matters. 3 The Act's proponents
would argue that multilateralism does not and should not mean setting aside
fundamental U.S. interests to placate governments either complacent about or
actively helping their nationals knowingly profit from property confiscated in
violation of international law by a tyrant known for systematic and gross
violations of fundamental human rights.
D. Democracy
1. Protecting Democracy
The Helms-Burton Act characterizes the Castro regime as a threat to
American national security" and to international peace and security.05
Congress has also determined that the Cuban government represents a threat
to liberal principles because of its human rights record, its violation of
international law on expropriation, its support for terrorism, its attack on
American unarmed civilian aircraft, 2" and its resistance to democratic
reform.2' Through these provisions, the Helms-Burton Act conforms with the
liberal tradition's principle of protecting democracy.
2. Promoting Democracy
Congress made the fundamental purpose of the Helms-Burton Act to help
bring democracy to Cuba. Section 3 states that the purposes of the Act
include: (1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining freedom and joining the
community of democratic States; (2) to encourage the holding of free and fair
elections in Cuba; and (3) to provide for an American policy framework to
203. See id. at 16-17 (noting U.S. position that neither the WTO nor NAFTA are appropriate forums
to settle what is a foreign policy issue and not a trade dispute).
204. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 2(28) (finding that "[flor the past 36 years, the Cuban
Government has posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States,"); § 3(3) (stating
a purpose of the Act to be "to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the face of
continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism.").
205. Id. § 2(14) (finding that "[t]he Castro government threatens international peace and security by
engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated
to international violence."); § 2(24) (finding that "massive and systematic violations of human rights may
constitute a 'threat to peace' under Article 39" of the U.N. Charter).
206. Id. § 116 (findings of Congress on the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes).
207. Id. § 2(16) (finding that "Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as 'pluralistic garbage'
and continues to make it clear that he has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society.").
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support the Cuban people as they move through a transition government to a
democratically elected government.2' Thus, the Act resonates with the liberal
tradition's call for the promotion of democracy.
E. Summary
The Helms-Burton Act rejects the use of the liberal strategies of economic
interdependence and international institutions until Cuba has become
democratic. The Act forcefully seeks, however, to uphold international law
and to protect and promote democracy in keeping with those tenets of the
liberal tradition.
V. LIBERAL REALISM V. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
Opponents and proponents of the Helms-Burton Act both make forceful
cases from within the liberal tradition. The controversy over the Act suggests
that at least two different perspectives are at work within the liberal tradition.
While liberals may share common goals and values, they sometimes disagree
dramatically on how to achieve their shared goals and values.2' The Helms-
Burton episode seems to be just a case in point as the United States faces off
against other liberal States about the proper strategy towards Cuba. Two
perspectives within the liberal tradition-liberal realism and liberal
internationalism 10-are helpful in analyzing this controversy among liberal
States because the Helms-Burton Act contains features of liberal realism, while
its opponents exhibit the tendencies characteristic of liberal internationalism.
A. The Helms-Burton Act and Liberal Realism
Liberal realism is a perspective within the liberal tradition that emphasizes
the exercise of military and economic power to protect the national interest and
to promote liberal interests and values in the international system. This
208. Id. § 3(1), (4), (5).
209. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 74 ("Liberals divide over what
international improvements can be made, how improvements can be made, and how much improvement is
really possible.").
210. 1 have analyzed liberal realism and liberal internationalism in the context of the use of force by
states, see generally id., and of the United Nations Security Council, see generally Fidler, Caught Between
Traditions, supra note 32.
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perspective recognizes the teachings of the realist school of international
relations theory that the anarchical nature of the international system forces
States to worry about power and to exercise power in their international
relations.2"' Liberal realists do not, however, exhibit the grim pessimism of
many classical realists, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau." 2 Instead, they seek to
blend together their commitment to liberal principles with an understanding of
the harsh nature of international relations.2"3 Liberal realists play the power
game in international relations "to provide security and order for the
democratic community of states and stability for the pursuit of economic
interdependence throughout the international system."214 The objective of the
liberal realist approach "is to make the position of democracy so secure that its
influence, coupled with the impact of economic interdependence, will nurture
the spread of democracy and capitalism in the international system. 215
As a result of its acknowledgment of realism, liberal realism views the four
fundamental strategies within the liberal tradition in a particular way. In an
international system made up of liberal and non-liberal States, economic
interdependence is not an end in itself but a means to making democracies
more powerful and secure. Liberal realists view economic interdependence as
an instrument of liberal power to be applied or denied in pursuit of national
security, international order, and the spread of democracy. In its policy
towards Cuba, the United States has used its economic power as a weapon
against Castro by maintaining an embargo on American trade with and
investment in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act continues this policy by
tightening the embargo. Castro previously balanced the American embargo
by his close alliance with the Soviet Union. When that counterweight
disappeared, Castro turned to other liberal States by opening Cuba to more
trade and investment. Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act constitute a
new way in which the United States uses economic interdependence as a
weapon of power because it forces nationals of other States to think twice
211. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 5 (5th ed. 1973) (famous 20th century
American realist arguing that "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.").
212. Stanley Hoffman & David P. Fidler, Introduction to ROUSSEAU ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
at lxxvii (Stanley Hoffman & David P. Fidler eds., 1991) (noting that Rousseau was perhaps the most
pessimistic of realists).
213. Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 394 (arguing that realists like Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan,
and Raymond Aron "either smuggled in or openly injected liberal values and goals whenever they went,
beyond empirical analysis, into their own attempt at showing how the jungle could be made livable ....
214. Fidler, Caught Betveen Traditions, supra note 32, at 436.
215. Id.
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about investing in Cuba. For foreign companies with property or operations
in the United States and interest in investing in Cuba, "the choice is between
an ice cream sundae and a root canal treatment." ' 6 U.S. economic power vis-
,-vis Cuba is, thus, enhanced by the interdependence that exists between the
United States and other liberal States.
Liberal realists also take a particular stance towards international law. For
liberal realists, the key element of international law is reciprocity because it is
through reciprocal behavior that "[c]ommon interests.., can become common
values represented in rules of international law."2 ' While reciprocity among
liberal States usually makes international law effective in inter-liberal
relations, reciprocity has frequently broken down in the relations of liberal and
non-liberal States."' When reciprocity breaks down in connection with a non-
liberal State, liberal realists place little confidence in institutionalized
procedures, like the International Court of Justice, to enforce international law.
Instead, liberal realists interpret international law to give the liberal State
sufficient freedom to pursue its own enforcement strategies.21 9
The international legal arguments made by Clagett, Leigh, and others fit
the liberal realist model. Cuba's illegal expropriations clearly demonstrate that
it breached and continues to breach reciprocity in the international law on
foreign investments. In addition, other liberal States and their nationals are
aiding and abetting Cuba's violations of international law by encouraging and
participating in trafficking of illegally expropriated property-activities that
also undermine reciprocity in international law. In the face of these
fundamental breakdowns of reciprocity, the United States faced "the notorious
weakness and ineffectiveness of international enforcement mechanisms."'
Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act interpret international law to permit the
United States to impose not only countermeasures against Cuba but also
liability in U.S. courts on third-state nationals that profit from Castro's
violations of international law at the expense of U.S. nationals. International
law, in the liberal realist perspective, supports the robust self-help strategy
found in the Helms-Burton Act.
216. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 429.
217. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 75.
218. See id. at 76-77 (discussing lack of reciprocity on the international legal rules on the use of force
between the United States and Soviet Union).
219. See id. at 84 (arguing that in interpreting international law on the use of force "[I]iberal realism
restores to the state the vitality of its right of self-defense.").
220. Clagett, Title I11, supra note 3, at 436.
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Liberal realists also consider interpretations of international law that
justify flouting fundamental liberal values to be misguided.22' Liberal realism
sees international law as an institution of international relations that should be
used to promote liberal interests and values. This position means that liberal
realists place international law in political context and avoid the tendency to
divorce law from politics.2 This trait of liberal realism manifests itself in the
position expressed through the Helms-Burton Act: third-state nationals are
knowingly helping keep a brutal dictator in power and are profiting from
illegally expropriated property at the expense of U.S. nationals. Such behavior
not only injures the United States but is also repugnant given liberal
attachment to property rights, the rule of law, the importance of economic
interdependence, and promoting democracy.
A specific example of the lack of political and moral context can be found
in Lowenfeld's international legal attack on the Helms-Burton Act. At no
point does Lowenfeld address the major thrust of the Act: third-state nationals
are intentionally attempting to profit from Castro's violations of international
law at the expense of U.S. nationals. Lowenfeld chooses to approach this issue
legalistically, arguing, for example, that "[tihere is no necessary connection
between the value of the property on which the [Helms-Burton] claim is based
and the value of the transaction on which the assertion of 'trafficking' rests."'
Liberal realism defines the core issue directly as "the immoral trafficking in
stolen property that today plays a major role in keeping Castro in funds and
therefore in power[.]" 4 The political and moral unreality of Lowenfeld's
analysis is compounded when he acknowledges that Castro is a tyrant. 5 If
Castro is a tyrant, and third-state nationals are knowingly acting to profit from
his violations of international law, then the moral and political context of this
issue point in the direction of using international law to redress international
wrongs and oppose tyrannical ambitions.
Similar observations can be made about the OAS Inter-American Juridical
Committee legal opinion. The interpretation of international law in this legal
opinion leaves open huge loopholes in the international law on the protection
221. See Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 78-85 (analyzing liberal realist
rejection of ICJ's ruling in Nicaragua case because, among other things, the ruling weakened a democratic
state's right to individual and collective self-defense against totalitarian indirect aggression).
222. See id. at 87 (discussing subordination of political reality to legal reasoning in the Nicaragua
case).
223. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 426.
224. Clagett, Title III, supra note 3, at 440.
225. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 433.
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of foreign investment. For example, the OAS Inter-American Juridical
Committee states that "[c]laims against a state for expropriation of the property
of foreign nationals cannot be enforced against the property of private persons
except where such property is itself the expropriated asset and within the
jurisdiction of the claimant state."26 Under this rule, third-state nationals can
knowingly invest in and profit from illegally confiscated land and other forms
of immovable property with impunity under international law. Such a rule
does not support the international legal regime on the protection of foreign
investment, which regime is important to the liberal strategy of economic
interdependence.2" The rule formulated by the OAS Inter-American Juridical
Committee interprets international law so as to give maximum freedom to the
government that illegally expropriated property and to third-state nationals
who attempt to profit from such illegal confiscations while restricting the
freedom of the State whose nationals were victimized to take measures to
counteract such behavior. 2Y8 Liberal realists hold that international law in this
area should be interpreted to give the victimized State maximum freedom to
respond to illegal confiscations and subsequent trafficking and to restrict the
ability of the confiscating State and third-state nationals to profit from illegal
acts.
The recent controversy about the alleged trafficking by Swiss banks of
property illegally confiscated by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s supports the
position taken by the proponents of the Helms-Burton Act. After initial hostile
reactions to United States congressional hearings on this matter, Swiss
representatives testified to the U.S. House of Representatives Banking
Committee that "they didn't think they were trafficking in stolen property, but
they would conduct a thorough investigation [and i]f it turned out that by some
chance any of it had crawled into their hands, they pledged their undying
226. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 5(d).
227. "International trade and investment-indeed, private business itself-cannot survive without
respect for property rights." Clagett, A Reply, supra note 97, at 643.
228. See Fidler, War, Lav & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 82 (discussing liberal realist critique
of ICI's Nicaragua holding that created opportunities for indirect aggression while severely restricting the
rights of individual and collective self-defense against such aggression).
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determination to get it back to the real owners-or their descendants-right
away.' 29
In connection with the liberal attachment to international institutions,
liberal realism teaches that liberal States must realize the limits of such
institutions when trying to deal with non-liberal StatesY Congress has
expressed a belief that engaging Castro in various international institutions
would not mellow his dictatorship. Like its attitude on economic
interdependence, liberal realism views international institutions as a means to
an end, not as an end in themselves.
The accusation leveled at the United States by liberal States, that it has
acted unilaterally through the Helms-Burton Act and ignored a multilateral
approach, touches on the perceived value of international institutions in the
relations among liberal States. Although liberal realist skepticism about the
potential of international institutions decreases substantially in the inter-liberal
context, multilateralism still remains a means to substantive ends. Liberal
realism finds no magic power in multilateralism to transform deep
disagreements between liberal States into tranquil compromise. The reaction
of some liberal States to the U.S. government's arguments about the illegality
and immorality of trafficking in illegally expropriated property illustrates this
point. According to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, those in foreign governments who acknowledge the U.S. concern
argue that the issue belongs in multilateral foray' The fora typically suggested
do not, as earlier analyzed, seem relevant to the nature of the specific
controversy. Multilateralism for the sake of multilateralism rarely impresses
the liberal realist, particularly when the proposed fora are substantively
inappropriate. For the liberal realist, the message, not the medium, is the
critical issue. In connection with the Helms-Burton Act, the United States has
enunciated its clear stand against trafficking in illegally expropriated property
unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally. From the liberal realist
229. Brice M. Clagett, Notes for Presentation at Hastings Conference (San Francisco, Jan. 25, 1997)
(on file with author). Clagett had earlier noted in a letter to the Washington Post the inconsistency of its
editorial condemnation of Title IIl of the Helms-Burton Act with its support for the claims of the owners
of property stolen by the Nazis during World War II. See Brice M. Clagett, 'Getting Back Your Gold,'
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1996, at A30 [hereinafter Clagett, Getting Back Your Gold].
230. See, e.g., Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 436 (arguing that under the liberal
realist perspective "international organizations and collective security systems constitute elaborate facades
of cooperation that do nothing to limit effectively the sovereignty of states with regard to international peace
and security.").
231. Libertad Hearing, supra note 13, at 15 (testimony of Jeffrey Davidow).
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perspective, there is irony in the accusation of unilateralism from other liberal
States when the United States made it clear to the entire world its concern
about Castro's plans to use illegally expropriated property to lure foreign
investment. Where was the appeal by other liberal States for multilateralism
when conflict was looming? Instead of a recognition of U.S. concerns, other
liberal States acted unilaterally by allowing their nationals to traffic in illegally
expropriated property. The cry for multilateralism diverts attention from the
fact that these liberal States and their nationals have been caught with their
hands in the cookie jar. 2
Liberal realism desires the spread of democracy in the international
system. 233 Liberal realism favors promoting the spread of democracy through
the exercise of power by liberal States to weaken tyrannical governments,
uphold principles of international law, and foster an economic interdependence
grounded in respect for property rights. Whether liberal power is exercised in
international institutions is a tactical consideration rather than a strategic
choice. By setting out to weaken Castro, reaffirm and enforce international
law, and encourage principled economic interdependence, the Helms-Burton
Act seeks the spread of democracy in keeping with liberal realist tenets.
B. Helms-Burton Opponents and Liberal Internationalism
Liberal internationalism is a perspective within the liberal tradition that
emphasizes the use of international organizations to bring stability and order
to international relations, and to promote economic interdependence and
democracy."' Liberal internationalism does not accept major teachings of
realism because it holds that international institutions have the potential to
move States away from power considerations toward more cooperative
relations. Liberal internationalism holds that international institutions
232. Clagett, A Reply, supra note 97, at 643 ("Those enterprises that are alarmed by Title IIl of Helms-
Burton, because they fear the consequences of having their fingers caught in the cookie jar, would be well-
advised to admit their mistake and end their trafficking forthwith.").
233. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought, supra note 33, at 103 ("The liberal realist tradition...
holds that an increasing presence of liberal democratic states in the international system will help moderate
the system and reduce the frequency and ferocity of armed conflict.").
234. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 430 (stating that liberal internationalism
"refers to the tradition of liberal thought that views international organization as vital to the maintenance
of international peace and security."). See also Michael J. Smith, Liberal and International Reform, in
TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 201, 215 (Terry Nardin & David A. Mapel eds., 1992) ("The liberal
tradition is replete with schemes to bolster international law . . . [and] to create new international
organizations.").
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"enhance cooperation by improving the quality of information, reducing
transaction costs, facilitating trade offs among issue-areas, facilitating
enforcement of accords, and enhancing states' ethical concerns." '235 The central
position of international organizations in liberal internationalism also elevates
international law as an important priority as well. International law facilitates
the creation of international institutions, and international institutions facilitate
the workings of international law. 6 Liberal internationalism seeks to put
international organizations and international law to work to promote economic
interdependence.? The connection between international institutions and
economic interdependence promoted by liberal internationalism figures very
prominently in the current international system."8 Finally, key to the synergies
between international organization, international law, and economic
interdependence is the leadership of liberal democracies. " ' The powerful
combination of better international cooperation, more effective international
law, and expanding economic interdependence, all overseen by liberal
democracies, creates powerful incentives for democratization in the
international system, which can be seen occurring today.40
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act sound many of the themes of liberal
internationalism. Liberal States have complained that the United States
ignored multilateral fora in adopting the unilateralist approach of the Helms-
Burton Act. From the liberal internationalist perspective, the liberal realist
emphasis on power seems anachronistic in the current international system.
Opponents sense in the Helms-Burton Act a lack of perspective when it and
235. Zacher & Matthew, supra note 42, at 136.
236. Slaughter Burley describes this interdependence in this way: "Institutionalists and international
lawyers subscribe to a common ontology of the international system: the actors, the structure within which
those actors act, and the process of their interaction. Both groups ... are describing a common agenda
focused on the study of improved institutional design for maximally effective international organizations,
compliance with international obligations, and international ethics." Slaughter Burley, supra note 48, at 206.
237. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions, supra note 32, at 447-48 ("International organization can
help facilitate economic interdependence by promoting peaceful economic intercourse between states and
by working to eliminate obstacles to freer trade and investment.").
238. Burchill, supra note 33, at 57 ("The recent proliferation of free trade agreements and associations
such as NAFTA, APEC and GATT (now the WTO) and the growing importance of international
organizations such as the G7, IMF and World Bank is indicative of the influence of liberal internationalism
in [the] post-Cold War period.").
239. Gardner, supra note 43, at 23 (commenting on the liberal internationalism view that "the
necessity of leadership by liberal democracies in the construction of a peaceful world order through
multilateral cooperation and effective international organizations.").
240. Burchill, supra note 33, at 62 (noting that "[t]he spread of liberal democracies and the zone of
peace is an encouraging development").
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its proponents argue that Cuba constitutes a threat to American national
security and international peace. On the one hand, Castro's regime is
apparently so weak that just one more shove from the United States will send
it to the ash heap of history. On the other hand, Castro is a totalitarian menace
to the strongest military and economic power on the face of the earth. The
effort to make the Marxist mouse in the Caribbean roar seems melodramatic
and signifies a mentality not in tune with American interests in multilateral
cooperation in hemispheric free trade and global economic interdependence.2 4
A coordinated approach of liberal democracies toward Castro's final days,
established in multilateral fora, would present Castro with a united democratic
front rather than a squabbling cabal that he can divide and annoy. Hints at the
elements of a coordinated approach have begun to appear through the smoke
released by the Helms-Burton cannonades of liberal States. Both European
leaders and Canadian officials have increased talk about conditioning
expanded trade and investment with Cuba on Cuba improving its human rights
record and moving towards democracy.2
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act also receive with great skepticism the
assertion that the United States' diplomatic position on "trafficking" was clear
from the start. The Clinton administration that sent out the 1993 diplomatic
cable was the same administration that sternly opposed the Helms-Burton
legislation until electoral politics intervened. 43 In addition, the Helms-Burton
legislation was not rocketing through Congress before the Brothers to the
Rescue incident, suggesting that the Act owes its existence not to American
moral outrage about trafficking but to the reelection ambitions of politicians.
Conveniently, proponents of the Act forget this tawdry domestic political
backdrop to the Helms-Burton Act. But it is this backdrop that explains the
American failure to engage in constructive multilateral diplomacy, not the
241. Morici, supra note 95, at 87 (arguing that the Helms-Burton Act "undermines the long-term goals
of United States international economic policy.").
242. Anthony DePalma, A Top Canadian Visits Cuba, Nettling Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1997, at A3 (reporting on Canadian foreign minister's trip to Cuba where he raised the human rights issue);
Nancy Dunne, supra note 28, at 3 (reporting that "[I]ast month European foreign ministers voted to link
expanded ties to Cuba with human rights improvements and progress towards democracy."). The United
States is claiming that the Helms-Burton Act "had focused the attention of European and other nations on
democracy in Cuba." Myers, supra note 29, at 1 (reporting on comments of Undersecretary of State
Eizenstat). See also The Cuban Tango, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1997, at 22 (editorial arguing that Canada
should use economic power to influence change in Cuba and should speak out more forcefully on human
rights issues).
243. Morici, supra note 95, at 87 (quoting Secretary of State Christopher as stating that "granting
Americans this right to sue in United States courts 'would be hard to defend under international law."').
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alleged unresponsiveness of other liberal democracies to American interests
in Cuba. Under liberal internationalism, domestic politicking is not a
principled reason for ignoring international institutions as a process to
construct cooperative approaches to problems.
The American outrage at the alleged illegality and immorality of
trafficking in expropriated property also rings hollow from the liberal
internationalist view of the circumstances. First, the intent of the Helms-
Burton Act is to prevent other countries from trading with and investing in
Cuba. The United States seeks to unilaterally terminate the development of a
process of economic interdependence among Cuba and many other States in
the international system. In its weakened state, Cuba is at its most vulnerable
to the process of economic interdependence that is a central engine for
democratization in the international system. Second, by subjecting third-state
nationals to liability in American courts, the United States has damaged
economic relations between itself and other liberal States. The blocking and
clawback measures passed by Canada, Mexico, and the European Union'"
have raised the economic stakes of the dispute for all sides. From the
perspective of liberal internationalism, the Helms-Burton Act's unilateral
attack on economic interdependence has set off a chain reaction that has
produced conflict and economic uncertainty.
Liberal internationalism also has several responses for the claims that the
Helms-Burton Act conforms with international law. International legal
analyses supporting the Act try to sustain its provisions by reference to
traditional, long-standing rules of international law-an approach which
attempts to present the Act as in no way novel or a departure from existing
law. The almost universal adverse reaction to the Act suggests, at the very
least, that the Act is not unexceptional as regards international law.
Proponents of the Act cannot point to precedents from international law where
a State has used a private cause of action to punish traffickers in illegally
expropriated property for damages attributable to the expropriating State.
Given the ramifications of enacting such a private cause of action, liberal
internationalism requires some sort of evidence of State practice
acknowledging a breach of international law by traffickers. Under liberal
internationalism, international law is a process that has established parameters
developed by States over centuries. Although the process is far from perfect
244. For a discussion of these measures, see Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note
57 (manuscript at 36-38).
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because it relies on State consent, it nevertheless deserves respect and
continued utilization to ensure its viability and stability. Such viability and
stability are crucial because international law facilitates international
institutions and economic interdependence. To claim as Helms-Burton
proponents do, that international law prohibits trafficking in illegally
expropriated property without any specific State practice on point (other than
the Act) to support such a rule challenges the international legal process
directly.
Liberal internationalists are not afraid to admit that international law may
allow third-state nationals to traffic in illegally expropriated property, even
though that may seem repugnant from the liberal perspective. The concern
with the stability of the international legal process means that liberal
internationalists recognize the shortcomings of international law but begin to
build consensus to reform international law where reform is needed. The
venue for reform should be, of course, multilateral fora, not unilateral attempts
to proclaim new rules of international law. Ironically, even forceful legal
advocates for the Act, such as Clagett and Leigh, indirectly acknowledge that
international law in the area subject to the Act needs to be solidified in the
form of a multilateral treaty.2 43
Liberal internationalism has a further concern with the international legal
validity of the Helms-Burton Act: its treatment of citizens of third States.
Proponents of the Act rail against those knowingly trafficking in illegally
expropriated property, and the Act subjects them to huge potential liabilities.
As the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee stated, provisions of the Act
threaten to deprive individuals and private enterprises of due process of law
because of the large damages the Act allows.' Clagett has answered this
charge arguing that "[s]uch concerns implicate domestic constitutional
considerations more than international law." 7  Liberal internationalists
respond that due process of law is very much a concern of international human
245. Id. (manuscript at 31-32) ("Still better would be an international convention that codified the rule
that title to property confiscated in violation of international law is invalid and that all governments, and
their nationals, should recognize and respect the rights of the true owner."); Libertad Hearing, supra note
13, at 26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh advocating negotiation "of a multilateral agreement which would
internationalize the common law rule that the thief cannot convey valid title for stolen property.").
246. OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 6(g) ("The claimant state may not deprive a foreign
national of the right in accordance with due process of law to effectively contest the bases and the quantum
of claims that may affect his property.").
247. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 17).
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rights law." s What liberal realists may refer to dismissively as "legalism" in
criticisms of the Act actually represents a fundamental concern at the heart of
the liberal tradition: the exercise of government authority against private
interests without due process of law. Even if international law prohibits
trafficking, imposing civil liability that violates due process of law and
fundamental notions of fairness must be called into question.
Liberal internationalism can also detect some legalistic reasoning in the
legal arguments of the Act's proponents. Take, for example, Clagett's
response to the concern that a trafficker is subjected to the full liability created
by Cuba plus thirty-seven years of interest attributable to Cuba-all subject to
trebling--for trafficking for a few months: the trafficker is a joint tortfeasor
and co-conspirator with Cuba and thus can legitimately be subject to the
imposition ofjoint and several liability.249 This argument is legalistic in taking
a principle of domestic law and applying it to international relations without
providing any evidence that such domestic principle has ever been applied in
international law. Brownlie notes, for example, that international law as
regards the joint responsibility of States, let alone of States and nationals of
other States, is "as yet indistinct, and municipal analogies are unhelpful."" °
The unsettled nature of international law on State joint tortfeasors or co-
conspirators stems largely from the fact that "practice is scarce."25' The idea
that a State and a national of another country can be joint tortfeasors or co-
conspirators and thus both be subject to joint and several liability suffers from
State practice being even scarcer than in the State-State context. In addition,
the appeal by Clagett to domestic concepts of joint and several liability for
joint tortfeasors ignores the problem that even under domestic tort law, a tort
committed today will not be linked in determining damages with a tort
committed nearly four decades earlier. The torts have to relate to independent
duties. While Castro can be seen to have behaved tortiously, international law
does not appear to impose on third-state nationals a duty not to traffic in
illegally expropriated property. The same applies with the criminal law
concept of conspiracy: a conspirator will only be held criminally liable for
248. See OAS Committee Opinion, supra note 78, 5(f) ("The nationals of foreign states have the
right to due process of law in all judicial or administrative proceedings that may affect their property. Due
process includes the possibility of effectively contesting both the basis and quantum of the claim in a legal
or administrative proceeding.").
249. Clagett, Who is Breaking International Law, supra note 57 (manuscript at 18).
250. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 456.
251. Id.
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those crimes in which the conspirator actually participates. If a fencer of
stolen property knowingly receives stolen property originally taken nearly four
decades ago, such fencer will not be charged under the criminal law with
conspiracy to commit the original theft. The crimes have to be independent
and distinct. Castro may have wrongfully expropriated property and be in
continuing violation of international law, but international law does not
apparently prohibit trafficking in illegally expropriated property. So Clagett's
assertion that imposing joint and several liability on traffickers for all the
damages caused by Cuba is legitimate turns out to have a basis in neither
international nor domestic legal principles.
By neglecting the advantages offered by international organizations,
causing friction in the regional and global processes of economic
interdependence, and interpreting international law myopically, the Helms-
Burton Act frustrates the liberal democratization process by turning the liberal
zone of peace into the zone of finger pointing and name calling. After the
Helms-Burton episode, the leadership of liberal democracies in international
organizations, economic interdependence, and international law is undermined
as the whole business looks as tawdry as the domestic politicking that gave rise
to the Act in the first place. As a result, liberal internationalism looks at the
Helms-Burton Act as a sad moment for the liberal tradition.
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL TO BRIDGE THE GAP
BETWEEN LIBERAL REALISM AND LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
I began this article by observing that the Helms-Burton Act controversy
challenged liberal thinking on international relations because it pitted liberal
States against each other in connection with the shared goal of bringing
democracy to Cuba. I analyzed the positions for and against the Act under the
four fundamental themes of the liberal tradition. Those supporting and
attacking the Act fall respectively into two different perspectives within the
liberal tradition: liberal realism and liberal internationalism. My analysis
hopefully demonstrates that the controversies generated by the Helms-Burton
Act relate to important tensions in the liberal tradition. Not only does the
liberal tradition help illuminate the Helms-Burton Act but the Helms-Burton
Act helps shed light on the liberal tradition.
The analysis developed in this article tells a story of division and
dissension within the liberal tradition, and the reader may be uncomfortable
with ending the story at this point. In this conclusion, I present a proposal to
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bring the liberal realist and liberal internationalist perspectives on the Helms-
Burton Act toward common ground.
Bridging the gap between liberal realism and liberal internationalism in
connection with relations with Cuba has to involve convergence on the
exercise of power, the roles of international organization and international law,
and moral sensibilities. In connection with the exercise of power, convergence
might be found in the strategy of economic interdependence. Liberal realism
rejects economic interdependence as a strategy to transform Cuba by
exercising American power to isolate Cuba economically. Liberal
internationalism wants to coax Cuba into the family of nations through trade
and commerce. A convergence could be created if: (1) liberal realism
embraces economic interdependence as a strategy, and (2) liberal
internationalism acknowledges that economic interdependence can be used as
a weapon of power against Castro. My proposal is that the United States and
its liberal allies use economic interdependence with a vengeance against
Castro's struggling regime. This strategy would not condition expanded trade
and investment on democratic reforms in Cuba; it advocates for opening the
floodgates of capitalism on Castro's rickety regime. The most delicious irony
in the sad history of Castro's rule would be to see him lose power because of
the forces unleashed by capitalism. Recasting liberal realism and liberal
internationalism in this way would pit the Marxist dinosaur Castro against the
high-powered, fast-moving forces of global capitalism. Castro would have
difficulty controlling the consequences of such a liberal strategy. Cubans
would begin to catch glimpses of and develop tastes for the full measure of
freedom they deserve.
The next convergence has to come on the roles of international
organizations and international law in opening capitalism's floodgates on
Cuba. A potential convergence can be found in using multilateral fora to
negotiate an agreement among liberal States that addresses the controversy in
international law exposed by the Helms-Burton dispute over third-state
nationals knowingly profiting from illegally expropriated property. Both sides
to the debate can point to State practice that supports their interpretation of
customary international law in connection with the Helms-Burton Act. While
a meticulous review of this body of State practice, and the views of the
publicists interpreting it, would be worthwhile given the international legal
controversy generated by the Act, Seidl-Hohenveldern's 1962 comment that
"[i]t will not lead far to count heads to see which of these views is
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predominant" might still be accurate. " An appropriate opportunity to attempt
a convergence of the disparate legal views may be found in either the current
proposals for the negotiation of a foreign investment treaty under WTO
auspices'" or the current attention focused on this issue by revelations of
trafficking in Switzerland of property illegally confiscated by the Nazis.2"
Finally, an ethical convergence has to be created. Unleashing the
awesome power of economic interdependence and establishing international
law regulating trafficking in illegally expropriated property does nothing to
compensate the wrongs perpetrated against property owners by Castro.
Clearly, negotiations between the United States and Cuba on a lump-sum
settlement for victimized property owners will have to be undertaken as their
relations normalize. Lump-sum settlements typically do not, however, provide
wronged investors with adequate compensation. Allowing economic
interdependence to develop does create some other possibilities to achieve
better compensation. First, increased trade with and investment in Cuba will
generate Cuban government revenues through tariffs and other taxes, portions
of which can be set aside as a term of a normalization agreement for purposes
of compensating victims of Castro's expropriations. Second, Congress and the
other legislatures of liberal States could make it a condition for private
companies to trade with or invest in Cuba that they must pay out of their
Cuban-originating revenues a small tax, the proceeds of which will go to
compensating expropriation victims. In lieu of a tax, private companies
seeking to invest in or trade with Cuba could be made to offer shares in their
capital stock to expropriation victims as compensation-in-kind. The essence
of these ideas is to make some serious effort to provide some compensation to
victims of Castro's larceny. Since private companies will be able to traffic
legally under my proposal, they should be included as contributors to righting
old wrongs. Full compensation for Castro's illegal expropriations will, I
252. lgnaz SeidI-Hohenveldem, Title to Confiscated Foreign Property and Public International Law,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 507, 508 (1962). But see F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186
(1990) (claiming that "there appears to be a substantial body of judicial practice which .. .allows the
dispossessed owner to recover his property" and that "[a] more comprehensive and more detailed
investigation ... would be unlikely to achieve more than to fill in rather than revise the picture that has
emerged.").
253. See Special Report: 1996 Trade Outlook, BNA International Trade Daily, Jan. 30, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File (mentioning that WTO will be discussing the issue of
investment and noting that the member states of the OECD are negotiating an investment agreement).
254. See Clagett, Getting Back Your Gold, supra note 229.
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submit, never be achieved; but ethical, if not legal, considerations mandate
some measure of compensation.
For the United States specifically, my proposal would mean a revolution
in its long-standing Cuba policy. Congress would have to end the embargo
and pass legislation to regulate trade and investment with Cuba that included
measures of compensation as discussed above. The executive branch would
have to negotiate a normalization of relations with Cuba, including a lump-
sum settlement with some ongoing sinking fund obligation. The executive
branch would also have to work with other States in negotiating rules to
prohibit trafficking in illegally expropriated property in future cases.
Many in Congress and the Cuban-American community cannot stomach
the thought of ending the embargo and allowing Castro to crow about his
victory over Uncle Sam. My attempt to recast liberal realism and liberal
internationalism would find no allies in anti-Castro bastions in the United
States and would be heresy before the anti-Castro altar. In addition, others
might be appalled at the abandonment of the moral and legal claims of the
victims of Castro's perfidy to a pittance for their losses and violated human
rights. Both of these positions embrace conviction to the point prudence is
excluded. Any "victory" Castro claimed would be only tactical, not strategic,
and it would be phyrric as economic interdependence would erase the tyranny
of Castro's rule. Wronged investors will never be fully compensated no matter
how unjust we think partial compensation is. My proposal points to common
ground on which liberal States can reconnect with their shared tradition and
produce a better future for the liberal alliance by balancing prudence and
conviction judiciously.
Lenin argued that-socialists should encourage capitalism's development
because such development would dialectically lead to capitalism's ruin. "Give
them the rope by which they will hang themselves," Lenin would say. Now
that Lenin's achievement is the one dangling at the end of history's noose,
perhaps ending the American embargo will give Castro the rope by which the
Cuban people will hang his Marxist legacy. Recasting liberal realism and
liberal internationalism on Cuban policy may rejuvenate the liberal tradition
and offer it a more powerful opportunity to give the Cuban people a new birth
of freedom.
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